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SUPERSESSION OF TREATIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Hans Aufrickt*
At the present an impressive number of bilateral and multilateral
treaties establishing a complex and expanding network of rules are in
force between the members of the community of nations. New treaties
are being concluded in rapid succession. As treaty arrangements increase
in number and scope, the problem of whether and to what extent these
treaties are mutually compatible assumes increased importance. The
purpose of this paper is to consider this problem in light of the principle
that "the later law supersedes the earlier law" (lex posterior derogat
priori) which is taken to be one of the "general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations" and, as such, applicable to conflicts between
earlier and subsequent treaties.1
A conflict between an earlier and a later treaty2 arises if both deal with
* Member Legal Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. See
Contributors' Masthead, p. 718 for biographical data. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author, and not necessarily those of the International Monetary Fund.
1 On "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as a source of international
law, see Article 38, Section 1(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice;
see also, FiNcir, Tna SoURcEs oF MODENm INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1937); LAUTERPACET,
PRIVATE LAw SOURCES AND ANALOGIES Or INTERNATIONAL LAW 67-71 (1927); SoRENsoN,
LES SoURCEs DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 123-152 (1946); Verdross, Les principes Giniraux
du Droit dans la Jurisprudence Internationale, 52 REcuEm DES Couas 195-249 (1935).
Lauterpacht and Verdross have repeatedly emphasized in their writings the necessity for
distinguishing between these "general principles" and "international custom" in the sense
of Article 38, Section 1(b) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
A considerable number of writers have adopted this view and discussed these "general
principles" primarily in terms of principles of private law. For a rather unsympathetic
treatment of this approach see GuTTERIDGE, COamARATIE LAW 64-71 (1946). On the
affinity of the concept of "general principles" with the philosophical ins gentium as defined
by Gaius including rules and legal institutions found everywhere, the bulk of which
consists of private law, see NUssBAuar, A CONCISE HISTORY Or THE LAW OF NATIONS pp. 20
and 267 (1947). To the extent that the charters of international organizations include
public law functions certain principles of public law, e.g., the principle of implied powers,
are also considered as "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." In Repara-
tions for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion of
April 11th, 1949) the majority of the International Court of Justice stated:
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred ,upon it by necessary
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. This principle of law
was applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice to the International
Labour Organization in its Advisory Opinion No. 13 of July 23rd; 1926, and must
be applied to the United Nations. (Italics added).
Id. at 182-183.
2 In this and the following sections the term "treaty" covers "treaties" as well as other
international agreements, except where another meaning of "treaty" or "agreement" is
specifically mentioned.
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the same subject matter in a different manner and if at least one State
is party to both treaties. In the absence of at least one common party, no
conflict is possible.3
With reference to the parties to treaties the following conflict situa-
tions may be distinguished: conflicts between bilateral treaties concluded
between the same parties A and B; conflicts between multilateral treaties
concluded between the same parties ABCD and so on; conflicts between
bilateral treaties concluded between three different parties one of which
is party to two or several bilateral treaties, i.e., between treaties between
AB, and treaties between BC; conflicts between multipartite treaties
concluded between different parties. If the number of parties to a later
multilateral treaty is smaller than the number of parties to the prior treaty
such an arrangement is designated as inter se agreement or treaty. For
the purposes of discussion these conflict situations will be grouped as
follows: Conflict of Treaties of the same Level irrespective of inter se
Arrangements, (Part I) and Conflict of Treaties of the same Level
with special Reference to inter se Arrangements, (Part II). Also, the
most-favored-nation clause will be dealt with in reference to the maxim
the later law supersedes the earlier law (Part III). In addition, con-
flicts between treaties of different level will be discussed (Part IV) as
well as the problem of the relationship of special rules to general rules
(Part V).
Since in addition to the parties the subject matter must be identical, it
is clear that the in pari materia principle is applicable to conflicts between
treaties.4 Accordingly, in international as well as in domestic law is the
in pari materia principle a necessary corollary to the rule that the later
law supersedes the earlier law.
A conflict between an earlier and a later treaty may be resolved in
one of the following ways: (A) The earlier treaty may be deemed super-
seded by the later treaty; 5 (B) An express declaration may be con-
3 See on this point Kelsen, Conflicts between Obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations and Obligations under other International Agreements, 10 U. oF Pirr. L. Rnv.
284, 285 (1949). "If two treaties are concluded by totally different parties, no conflict of
obligations is possible. At least one party must be common.
4 On the in pari mnateria doctrine as a principle of statutory construction see, e.g., 2
SUTE.RLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, C. 52, §§ 5201-5211; especially § 5205
(3d ed., Horack, 1943).
5 A distinction has frequently been made between "supersession" (which presumably
leaves the prior rule potentially effective should the later obligation be abrogated) and
"abrogation" (which presumably voids once and for all the prior obligation). This
distinction is, however, not generally observed in the practice of states or international
courts. In addition, "abrogate" is the closest English equivalent of derogare. For these
reasons, the words "abrogate", "supersede", and "terminate" will be used as synonyms
throughout this paper, unless a different connotation is expressly indicated.
[Vol. 3 7
SUPERSESSION OF TREATIES
tained in the later treaty to the effect that the earlier treaty has been
repealed; (C) The later treaty may contain an express provision that
it is not at variance with the letter or spirit of an earlier treaty; (D)
A treaty may contain an express provision declaring that in future no
conflicting treaty may be concluded; (E) A treaty may contain a
pactum de contrahendo, i.e., an agreement to agree on new terms and
to supersede thereby existing treaty obligations.
Although the foregoing clauses or devices are designed to forestall or
resolve conflicts between treaties, it may be controversial in actual situ-
ations whether or not they are adequate to resolve "automatically" such
conflicts. At times, the applicability of these clauses or devices to specific
treaty situations may be at issue. Illustrations of such controversies- are
rendered throughout this essay, but more particularly in Part I.
I. CONFLICT OF TREATIES OF THE SAME LEVEL IRRESPECTIVE OF
Inter Se ARRANGEMENTS
As previously indicated the maxim lex posterior derogat priori is
applicable only to conflicts between treaties to which at least one party
is identical. Although, identity of parties is an essential feature of con-
flicts between treaties the discussion in this section will not concentrate
on conflict situations which arose primarily because different obligations
have been created vis-4.-vis different parties to two or more treaties.
The discussion will be focussed rather on various situations or contro-
versies in which the applicability of the above mentioned five tra-
ditional clauses or devices which are designed to forestall or resolve
conflicts between treaties was the main issue or one of the main issues.
(A) Earlier Treaty deemed to be superseded by Later Treaty. It is
submitted that the maxim lex posterior derogat priori is, in principle,
designed to justify "implied" or "tacit" supersession of an earlier by a
later treaty. Nevertheless, the application of the maxim may be qualified
by the principle that "tacit or implied abrogation is not favored" and
therefore a court or any other agency which is called upon to resolve
conflicts between treaties will endeavour to harmonize the meaning of
the several treaty instruments.6 However that may be, there can be no
doubt that tacit or implied supersession is normally one of the essential
features of the lex posterior derogat priori maxim.
6 See The Franciska, 2 Eng. Pr. Cas. 371 (1855). In this case Dr. Lushington, Judge of
the Prize Court stated:
In order to constitute revocation by implication, the inference must be free from
doubt; it must be proved that the provisions contained in the latter instrument are
such as to be wholly irreconcilable with those of the former; that the two cannot
reasonably co-exist together. The presumption is against such a revocation....
Id. at 404. See on this case also McNAxR, THE LAW 01? TETIms 476-477 (1938).
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Whether in the absence of an express clause to this effect a later treaty
actually supersedes an earlier on the same subject matter may be deter-
mined by appropriate international or domestic agencies.
Treaties, like other legal instruments, frequently contain specific pro-
visions as to their termination as well as to their effect on previous treaties
on the same matter. In the absence of such express provisions the ques-
tion may arise whether a treaty should ipso iure be considered as termi-
nated merely because it is deemed incompatible with a subsequent treaty;
in other words, whether the express consent of the parties to conclude
and put into effect a new treaty includes an implied consent on the termi-
nation of the antecedent treaty on the same subject.7
In the practice of states the principle of implied supersession of treaties
by treaties has frequently been invoked. Thus the United States De-
partment of State took the position that the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation of 1830 between the United States and the Ottoman Empire
should be considered as having been terminated through the entry into
force of the Treaty of Establishment and Sojourn of October 28, 1931,1
Although neither the latter Treaty nor the related Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation,1° effective April 22, 1930, contained any specific refer-
ence to the termination of the 1830 Treaty.
Similarly, several authors recognize that the entry into force of a new
treaty on the same matter which is in conflict with a prior one is to be
considered a legitimate procedure of terminating an earlier treaty."
Certain French authors go even further. They combine the principle
lex posterior derogat priori with the principle of the contrarius actus.
This approach in its most extreme version implies that a treaty can
legally be terminated only by another treaty which is at variance with
the former.'
7 See on this point, with special emphasis on treaties between same parties, Article 22 (a)
and comment Harvard Research, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. INTL'n
L. 1009 et seq. (Supp. 1935).
8 2 TR ATIES, CoNvExTioNs, INTERNATiONAL. ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMMTS BarWER
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND O=nR PowERs 1318 (Malloy, 1910). Hereinafter
referred to as TREArrss, etc.
9 4 TREATiES, etc. 4670 (Trenwith 1938).
10 Id. at 4667. See on the State Department's view 5 HACxWORTIE, DIGEsT Or INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 306-307 (1943).
11 1 OPPENH Em, INTERNATIONAL LAW 842 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948).
12 See on this principle French Nat. Ry. v. Chavannes, (1943) in LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL.
DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PuBLiC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 1943-1945 266-267 (1949).
Although this case involved a conflict between a domestic measure and an international
convention and not a conflict between an earlier and a later treaty the decision of the French
Court of Appeal of Aix, of February 9, 1943, is noteworthy in this context. The Court held
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Whereas decisions by international or domestic tribunals on conflicts
between treaties are comparatively rare, the practice of states, as evi-
denced, e.g., in their diplomatic correspondence abounds with instances
where states accuse each other of having concluded new treaties, usually
with third states, which are deemed incompatible with earlier treaties.13
If the parties to the new treaties have failed to insert express pro-
visions relating to the status of earlier treaties such silence may be
interpreted as an intent to uphold the continued validity of the previous
treaties. However, whether an alleged conflict is tantamount to a real
conflict will in the last analysis depend on the wording of the allegedly
conflicting treaties as well as on their interpretation and application by
the parties concerned.
In the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex case14 the
Permanent Court of International Justice was inter alia called upon to
decide whether Article 435, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Versailles with
its Annexes "has abrogated or is intended to lead to the abrogation" of
that the Convention of Rome of November 23, 1933, on the Transport of Goods by Rail
prevails over the French Law of July 27, 1940, on the ground that:
The Convention of Rome is an international treaty which binds the States parties to
it until such time as they withdraw therefrom in the form and after the giving of
the notice provided by the Treaty itself, and no one of the High Contracting Parties
can withdraw therefrom of its own accord.
Id. at 266. Prof. Suzanne Bastid in her note on this case sees in this decision a direct
application of the doctrine of the termination of treaties by contrarius actus as espoused,
by CHAILLEY, LA NATuRE JuRmIQUE DEs TRAITES INTFawAnoNArx SE ON DF DRoiT CoN-
TMpoRA3A 109-130, 318f (1932); see on this point Prof. Bastid's comment in SmrnmN
JuamiDQuE pt. 2418 (1943); on the preceding page Chailley's doctrine is summarized in
the following sentence:
Pour qu'une norme juridique 61aborke suivant une certain procedure cesse d'@tre en
vigeur elle doit faire l'objet d'une abrogation rialisie au moyen d'un acte contraire,
dest a dire suivant les formes nvtmes observie lors de sa creation.
It is doubtful, however, whether the French Court accepted this doctrine without qualifica-
tion, since it expressly recognizes that termination of an international convention is
permissible "in the form and after the giving of the notice provided by the Treaty itself."
Accordingly, whenever a treaty expressly permits its unilateral renunciation by one of the
parties no contrarius actus, i.e., no new treaty is required to supersede or invalidate such
treaty. However, if there is no express provision for unilateral or agreed termination of
a Treaty it may be argued that conclusion of a new treaty is, though not the only con-
ceivable, but certainly the most appropriate form of terminating the antecedent treaty. On
Chailley's doctrine see RoussEAu, PPaNcmzs GaNERAux Du DR= INTELATnoNAL PUBLIc
361-363 (1944). It has also been argued that a treaty which does not contain any clauses
relating to its termination may never be terminated. The correct view is probably that,
in the absence of a termination clause, a treaty should be considered a "permanent" or
"eternal" treaty if the nature of the treaty, its purpose, or the intention of the parties
would justify such an interpretation.
13 For examples of such allegations see RoussrAu, PaIctis GENERAux Du DROIT
INTEaRAT ONAL Puiuc 766-780 (1944).
14 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 46 (1932).
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the Treaties of Paris of 1815 and of other supplementary acts regarding
the customs and economic regime of the free zones of Upper Savoy and
the District of Gex.' 5 Judge Dreyfus in his Dissenting Opinion inter-
preted the clause in Article 435, (2) of the Treaty of Versailles "that
the stipulations of the Treaties of 1815 and of the other supplementary
acts concerning the free zones of Upper Savoy and the Gex district are
no longer consistent with present (i.e., post 1919) conditions" as follows:
I continue to think that Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles
has abrogated the stipulations which established the zone of the District
of Gex, and that it was intended to lead to the abrogation of those pro-
visions which relate to the zones of Upper Savoy and Saint-Gingolph.10
(Italics added).
By contrast, the majority of the Court, by six votes to five, held:
That, as between France and Switzerland, Article 435, Paragraph 2, of
the Treaty of Versailles, with its Annexes, neither has abrogated nor is
intended to lead to the abrogation of the provisions. 17 (Italics added).
of the various treaties of 1815 and of the relevant supplementary acts.18
The majority held in particular:
The text itself of Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles
draws from the statement that the former provisions are not consistent
with present conditions no other conclusion but that France and Switzer-
land are to settle between themselves the status of the free zones. ... In
particular, this text does not set forth the conclusion that abrogation of
the old stipulations relating to the free zones is a necessary consequence
of this inconsistency.1 9
Thus Judge Dreyfus, at least as regards the District of Gex, considered
15 By Article 1 of the Special Agreement, signed at Paris on October 30, 1924, Switzerland
ancj France formulated the question at issue as follows:
It shall rest with the Permanent Court of International Justice to decide whether,
as between Switzerland and France, Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles,
with its Annexes, has abrogated or is intended to lead to the abrogation of the pro-
visions of the Protocol of the Conference of Paris of November 3rd, 1815, of the
Treaty of Paris of November 20th, 1815, of the Treaty of Turin of March 16th, 1816,
and of the Manifesto of the Sardinian Court of Accounts of September 9th, 1829,
regarding the customs and economic regime of the free zones of Upper Savoy and the
Pays de Gex, having regard to all facts anterior to the Treaty of Versailles, such as
the establishment of the Federal Customs in 1849, which are considered relevant by the
Court.
Quoted in P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 46 pp. 5-6 (1932).
16 Id. at 110. It is not quite clear how Judge Dreyfus, arguing on the premise of
implied abrogation, arrived at the conclusion that Article 435(2) of the Treaty of Versailles
has abrogated the regime of the District of Gex, but that it was only intended to abrogate
the zones of Upper Savoy and Saint-Gingolph. See on this point also the submissions of
the French Government. Id. at 8-9.
17 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 46 at 79 (1932).
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 48.
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Article 435(2) as containing an implied abrogation" of the existing cus-
toms and economic regime in the Free Zones. By contrast, the majority
understood this provision requiring France and Switzerland to agree be-
tween themselves on a modification of the existing regime. Pending the
conclusion of such an agreement "this regime must continue in force so
long as it has not been modified by agreement between the Parties." 21
(B) Express abrogation of earlier treaty. A treaty may contain a
clause that a particular provision or that all provisions of an earlier treaty
are abrogated by a subsequent treaty.2 Strictly speaking, the maxim
lex posterior derogat priori renders such express clauses redundant, for,
as previously indicated, it is the rationale of the clause to compare the
relative validity of a later with an earlier clause even in the absence- of
express abrogation. However, it cannot be denied that express abro-
gation may help to clarify an otherwise confusing situation by indicating
which provision is to be considered as repealed.
Express abrogation may also be a useful technique, in order to fore-
stall a situation where the maxim lex posterior derogat priori would be
nullified by the principle that tacit abrogation is not favored or not
presumed.
Express repeal of an earlier treaty by a later treaty may be em-
bodied in a clause revoking an earlier treaty in toto or in a clause which
more specifically states that the later treaty supersedes all those pro-
visions of the earlier treaty which cover the same subject matter and
which are inconsistent with the later treaty.3
The In re Ross case24 furnishes an illustration of the principle that
even an express clause in a later treaty that all the provisions of an
earlier convention are revoked is subject to judicial scrutiny. Article 4
of the Convention executed by the Consul General of the United States
and the governors of Simoda on June 17, 1857, granted to American
consuls in Japan authority to try "Americans committing offenses in
Japan);5 in accordance with American law. By contrast, Article 6 of
the Treaty of 1858 with Japan provided that "Americans committing
offenses against Japanese shall be tried in American consular courts
under American law.' 28 Article 12 of the 1858 Treaty further provided
20 Id. at 110; see also note 16 suPra.
2 Id. at 80.
22 For quotations of and references to such clauses see 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1522
(2d ed. 1943), and 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 304-306 (1943).
23 See 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1521-1523 (2d ed. 1943).
24 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
2- Id. at 465.
26 Id. at 466.
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that "as all the provisions of a convention executed by the Consul General
of the United States and the governors of Simoda, on the 17th of June,
1857, are incorporated in this Treaty, that convention is also revoked." 7
The Court, in considering the question whether American consuls in
Japan could try an American for an offense committed against a non-
Japanese, held that the express repeal of the Treaty of 1857 was based
on the assumption that all its provisions were incorporated into the Treaty
of 1858. The revocation is therefore limited only to those provisions
which have been incorporated; the 1857 Treaty remains in force "as to
the unincorporated provisions"28 and thus American consuls had the
jurisdiction contended for. The Court upheld thereby "the practical
construction to the alleged revocation by the authorities of both countries"
and declared as "erroneous" the statement in the 1858 Treaty that all
provisions of the former have been incorporated.'m It may be added that
the Court, presumably after having compared the content of both treaties,
found that the later treaty did not, as alleged, cover the same subject
matter as the earlier one, since it did not provide for the case of Amer-
icans committing offenses in Japan against non-Japanese, and that there-
fore the provisions of the earlier treaty relating to those subject matters
which have not been covered in the later treaty are still in force. In
short, the Court apparently interpreted even an "express revocation"
in the light of the in pari materia principle.3
Article 11 of the Convention relating to Liquor Traffic in Africa, signed
in Saint-Germain on September 10, 1919, furnishes an interesting exam-
ple of express abrogation by reference to the in pari materia principle
(see below "matters dealt with in the present Convention"); it expressly
repeals not one or all the provisions of one particular earlier Convention,
but all former general Conventions on the same subject matter to the
extent that they are incompatible with the 1919 Convention. It reads:
All the provisions of former general international Conventions relating to
the matters dealt with in the present Convention shall be considered as
abrogated in so far as they are binding between the Powers which are
parties to the present Convention.31
Certain clauses providing for express abrogation provide that the new
treaty abrogates an earlier treaty only between or among the parties to
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Id. at 467.
30 Id. at 466.
31 Text of Convention in 1 HuDsox, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 352-359 (1931). Article
11 appears at 358.
[Vol. 3 7
SUPERSESSION OF TREATIES
the new treaty, and that the earlier treaty shall remain in force between
those parties which do not subscribe to the new treaty.2 The amended
version of Article XXIX, Section 5,1' of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (hereafter sometimes referred to as GATT) may be cited
as an illustration of this statement; it provides that pending an agree-
ment between those contracting parties which have not accepted the
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, the General
Agreement of Tariff and Trades shall remain in force in respect to those
parties, notwithstanding the fact that Article XXIX, paragraph 2 of the
GATT (as amended) provides that Part II of the GATT "Shall be sus-
pended on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into force."
In view of the decl4ration of the Department of State of the United
States of December 6, 1950,34 on the intention of the United States not
to submit to Congress for its approval the Havana Charter it appears
extremely unlikely that the provisions of the GATT will be superseded
in the near future by the proposed Havana Charter. In any case, the
draft amendment to Article XXIX, paragraph 5 of GATT is a noteworthy
application of the principle that certain parties to a multilateral treaty
reserve the right to remain governed by an earlier treaty, even if the
majority of the Treaty-partners are willing and in a position to abandon
an earlier treaty in favor of a new one.
32 See, for example, Article 27(1) of the International Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, Revised at Brussels, June 26th, 1948 which reads:
This Convention shall replace, in relations between the Countries of the Union, the
Convention of Berne of the 9th September 1886, and the subsequent revisions thereof.
The instruments previously in force shall continue to be applicable in relations with
countries which do not ratify this Convention.
33 As amended by the Protocol of September 12, 1948 (not yet in force) ; for text of the
amended version of Article XXIX see The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (A-
mended Text) U.S. DEP'T oF STATE COInERCIAL PorIcY SER. No. 124, pp. 61-62 (1950).
34 It should be noted that on December 6, 1950, the U.S. Department of State issued a
Press Release relating to the Trade Agreements program, including the proposed Charter
for an International Organization. This Release states that the interested United States
agencies have reviewed this progrem; as a result of this review they
have recommended and the President has agreed that while the proposed Charter for
an International Trade Organization should not be resubmitted to the Congress, Congress
should be asked to consider legislation which will make American participation in the
General Agreement more effective.
It thus seems extremely unlikely that the Havana Charter for an ITO will come into force
in the near future. The question remains, however, whether and to what extent the con-
tracting parties to GATT are obligated or consider themselves obligated by Article XXIX of
GATT to apply to the fullest extent of their executive authority the general principles of
the Geneva Draft of the ITO Charter as provided for in the original version of paragraph 1 of
Article XXIX of GATT. See on this point, also Hexner, The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and the Monetary Fund in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND I STAFF PAPERS 436
(1951).
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(C) Later treaty contains express provision that it does not conflict
with earlier treaty. In several treaties there are express statements to
the effect that the later treaty is not designed to abrogate one or several
earlier international arrangements or conventions. Article 21 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations provides that nothing in the Covenant
shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements "such
as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings such as the Monroe
Doctrine." In other words, the Covenant is not to be considered as
overriding arbitration treaties or regional understandings which were in
force at the time the League of Nations was established. 5 Similarly,
Article 52 of the United Nations Charter provides that "nothing in the
Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements. . . . "
Whereas the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations
Charter expressly recognize the validity of certain regional arrangement
as "special law" (lex specialis) which does not yield to the "general
law" of the Covenant or the Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty, for
example expressly states that the special commitments embodied in this
Treaty are not incompatible with the rights and obligations under the
United Nations Charters of those parties to the Treaty which are mem-
bers of the United Nations 7
The above mentioned clauses which expressly contend the compati-
bility of two or several Treaties, which were concluded at different dates,
are not necessarily conclusive. A realistic appraisal of these clauses
35 On the significance of Article 21 of the League of Nations Covenant see RAY, Com-
MENTAIRE Du PACTE Da- LA SOCIET9 DES NATIONS SEoN LA POLITIQUE ET LA JURISPRUDENCE
DEs ORGAwEs Da LA SOCIfTi (1930); ENGEL, LEAGUE REFoRm: AN ANALYSIS oF Oa'rILc
PROPOSALS AND DISCUSSIONS 1936-1939 (1940); and LEAGUE OF NATIONS, SPECIAL CoM-
iMITTEE SET UP TO STUDY THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF = COVENANT, REPORT
(League of Nations Publication, Sales Number: 1938.VII.1).
36 On Article 52 of the United Nations Charter see GOODRICH & HARIRRO, CHARTER OF
TnE UNITED NATIONS 309-315 (2d ed. 1949); KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
319-328 (1950).
37 Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949 in Washington reads:
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the
rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
T.I.A.S. 964, pp. 4-6. See also KELsEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF UNITED NATIONS
913-926 (1951). Kelsen states at 925:
Except Article 1-of which as pointed out, it might be doubtful whether it fully
complies with Article 52, paragraph 2 of the Charter-the North Atlantic Treaty does
not contain any provisions incompatible with Chapter VIII of the Charter.
In reference to Article 1 Kelsen states that it is doubtful whether the provisions "establishing
the obligation of the parties to settle international disputes by peaceful means-an obliga-
tion which has nothing to do with collective self-defence" suffices to fulfill the requirement
of Article 52(2) of the Charter, i.e., that settlement of local disputes shall be achieved
[Vol. 3 7
SUPERSESSION OF TREATIES
would perhaps more appropriately consider them as establishing a pre-
sumption against a conflict between the earlier and later treaty; however,
this presumption is rebuttable 8 Actually, the alleged compatibility may
be challenged by a state or international organization declaring that
certain treaties or their application are mutually incompatible.
Usually there is no special procedure provided in the treaty instru-
ments for the settlement of such conflicts. If the conflict is considered
"through" the regional arrangement or by regional agencies. Id. at 924. For the North
Atlantic Treaty in relation to Italy see id. at 925-926. See also, BEcKETr, THE NORTH
ATLATic TRETYZ, THE BRussELs TREATY AND THE CHARTER or THE UNiTED NATIONS,
especially p. 34-35 (1950). See also Article 10 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, signed in Rio de Janeiro, on September 2, 1947, which provides that "None of
the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of
the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations." TI.A.S. 1838, at 26.
38 The decision of the Central American Court of Justice of September 30, 1916, in the
case of Costa Rica v. Nicaragua may be recalled in support of the above statement.
Nicaragua was obligated under Article 8 of the Treaty of Limits with Costa Rica, signed
on April 15, 1856, not to make any grants to third states for the purpose of building an
inter-oceanic canal across its territory without first consulting Costa Rica. For text of
Article 8 of this Treaty see 11 A.. J. INT'L L. 193 (1917). Nicaragua's duty to live up to this
obligation was subsequently reaffirmed by the award of President Cleveland, March 22, 1888,
on the boundary dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; see especially point 10 of
this award in 2 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1945, 1966 (1898). In 1916 Nicaragua
without consulting Costa Rica, concluded a Treaty with the United States, the so-called
Bryan-Chamorro Convention, which granted in Article I to the United States exclusive
proprietary rights which are necessary and convenient for the construction, operation and
maintenance of an inter-oceanic canal. The text of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty is quoted
in 11 A. .J. INT'L L. 190-191 (1917); for United States proviso see id. at 192. Costa Rica
protested against this treaty and submitted a complaint against Nicaragua to the Inter-
American Court of Justice. On September 30, 1916 this Court, decided
that the Government of Nicaragua has violated, to the injury of Costa Rica, the
rights conferred upon the latter by the Cafias-Jerez Treaty of Limits of April 15,
1858, the Cleveland Award of March 22, 1888, and the Central American Treaty of
Peace and Amity of December 20, 1907.
11 A.M.J.INT'L. 210 (1917). It is noteworthy that the Court arrived at this decision
although the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty had been ratified by the United States with the
proviso that the Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the said Convention
are given with the understanding to be expressed as part of the instrument of ratification
that nothing in said convention is intended to affect any existing rights of any of the
said named states [i.e., Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras], (Italics added),
quoted in 11 Aax.J.INT'L L. 192 (1917). In reference to Costa Rica's request "for the
nullification of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty the Court held that it "can make no declara-
tion whatsoever, because of the fact that the Government of the United States of North
America [sic] is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court." 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 210 (1917).
On this case see also U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1916 (1925) at 811-890, and HuDsoN, INTER-
NATIONAL TRIBUNALS 98 (1944); for Nicaragua's refusal to accept this decision see id. at
130-131. On the Court's Order of May 1, 1916 requiring Costa Rica and Nicaragua "to
maintain the status quo existing between them before negotiating the treaty which is the
cause of the present contention" see 6 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114
(1943).
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a "justiciable dispute"39 and the parties concerned are signatories to
the "optional clause" (Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice) the Court may be called upon to
settle the dispute by virtue of its jurisdiction to settle "all legal dis-
putes concerning (a) the interpretation of a treaty. . . ." If, however,
the conflict between two or more treaties is not considered a "legal"
conflict, the dispute may, in the absence of any procedural provisions,
be settled in any of the traditional forms for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes,4 such as diplomatic channels, international
conference, arbitration.
In general, alleged incompatibilities between regional and universal
or quasi-universal treaties are frequently not incompatibilities between
specific provisions of these treaties as such, but rather incompatibilities
between a specific action, actually taken or contemplated, under one of
these treaties. A defensive alliance, for example, may rightly be con-
sidered by its members as indispensable "to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained."'41 Accordingly,
any statement that such a defensive alliance is a threat to the peace of
the non-participants in such alliance may appear preposterous. Never-
theless, defensive alliances are often attacked for having a hostile, if
not offensive, character vis-h-vis non-members of the alliance. Such an
alliance, however, could be considered as offensive rather than defensive
only, if one or several of its members, under a pretext of being attacked,
actually resort to armed hostilities or war. In such a case, however,
the incompatibility of certain defensive alliances with more compre-
hensive undertakings for maintaining or reestablishing peace and security
does not stem from the letter or purpose of the alliance itself, but rather
from the ignoring of its terms.
(D) Clause providing that no future treaty which would be incon-
sistent with the present treaty may be concluded. At times treaties con-
tain a clause providing that none of the parties to the treaty may in the
future conclude any treaty or agree to individual clauses that would be
inconsistent with an earlier treaty. Such a clause is designed to operate
as an exception to the maxim lex posterior derogat priori or in other
-39 On justiciable disputes see, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, Tim FuNCTION Or LAW iN THE INTER-
NATIONAL ComuumTY (1933), especially pp. 19-21, 139-144, 153-165.
40 The question whether another than a peaceful settlement may be considered a
"settlement" is outside the scope of this paper.
41 The words in quotation marks are quoted from Paragraph 2 of the Preamble to
the United Nations Charter.
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words to resolve a possible conflict between an earlier and a later treaty
in favor of the earlier treaty.
It may suffice to quote in this context Article 20 of the League of
Nations Covenant and Article 103 of the United Nations Charter. Under
paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the League of Nations Covenant the
Members of the League "solemnly undertake that they will not here-
after enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms" of the
Covenant. By contrast, Article 103 of the United Nations Charter does
not expressly differentiate between treaties entered into prior to the entry
into force of the United Nations Charter and treaties concluded subse-
quent to the effective date of the United Nations Charter. In the light of
the legislative history of Article 103 there is, however, no doubt that it
is also designed to cover obligations arising under agreements which
constitute the later law as compared with the United Nations Charter. 2
(E) Agreement to agree. Several treaties contain clauses which in
effect constitute an agreement to agree (pactum de contrahendo). Such
a clause may contain a promise to abrogate existing treaty obligations
which antedate a later treaty to the extent that the earlier treaty is
inconsistent with the later treaty; to conclude an entirely new agree-
ment on a certain subject matter or on certain subject matters, but leav-
ing wide discretion to the parties as to the terms of the new agreement;
or to conclude a new agreement which is to be governed by certain guiding
principles set forth in the pactum de contrahendo.
Article 20, paragraph 2 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
furnishes an example of a clause in which members of the League, who,
prior to joining the League, have undertaken any obligation inconsistent
with the terms of the Covenant, pledge "to take immediate steps to
procure .. .release from such obligations."
In the International Commission of the River Oder case 3 the Per-
manent Court of International Justice was called upon to determine
whether the Commission's jurisdiction extended to tributaries of the
42 See the Report of the Third Meeting of Committee IV/2 of the San Francisco Con-
ference Doc. No. 933, 13 U.N. Conf. Doc. 703, 708 (1945), which contains the following
statement:
Concerning the second rule of Article 20 of the Covenant, by which the members
undertook not to enter thereafter into any engagement inconsistent with the terms
thereof, the Committee has thought it to be so evident that it would be unnecessary
to express it in the Charter, all the more since it would repeat in a negative form the
rule expressed in paragraph 2 of Chapter II of the Charter.
See also GooD airc & IT.MBRO, CMARMR OF T UrN= NATIONS 517-519 (2d ed. 1949)
and Kelsen, Conflicts between Obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and
Obligations under other International Agreements, 10 U. o PITT. L. Rxv. 287-289 (1949).
43 P'.C.J.J., Ser. A, No. 23 (1929).
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Oder within Polish territory. A dispute arose as to whether the Treaty
of Versailles or the subsequent Barcelona Convention of 1921," which
had not been ratified by Poland, should supply the basis of decision.
The Treaty of Versailles by Articles 332 to 337 established a regime of
navigable waterways of international concern and by Article 338 further
provided that:
The regime set out in Articles 332 to 337 above shall be superseded by
one to be laid down in a General Convention [i.e., the Barcelona Con-
vention of 1921] drawn up by the Allied and Associated Powers, and
approved by the League of Nations, relating to the waterways recognized
in such Convention as having an international character.45
Stating that the parties to the Treaty of Versailles "have agreed that
certain provisions of that Treaty shall be superseded by those of the
future General Convention," the Court described the issue as "whether
this supersession depends on ratification of the said [Barcelona] Con-
vention by the States concerned-in this particular case on ratification
by Poland. ' 46 The Court concluded:
.. it must be considered that reference was made to a Convention made
effective in accordance with the ordinary rules of international law amongst
which is the rule that conventions, save in certain exceptional circum-
stances, are binding only by virtue of their ratification. 47
Finding that neither the Treaty of Versailles nor the Barcelona Con-
vention4 7 intended "to derogate from that rule,' 4 the Court held that
the territorial jurisdiction question was to be decided solely on the basis
of the Treaty of Versailles. Although Judge Huber agreed with the final
outcome of the case under the Treaty of Versailles rule, in his separate
"Observations" he felt compelled to comment on the Court's laying aside
of the Barcelona Convention as follows:
It is difficult to admit that the carrying out of Article 338, which lays
down imperatively-and not simply as a possible alternative-the super-
session of the "regime set up in Articles 332 to 337 ... by one to be laid
down in a general convention", can depend on the ratification of that con-
vention as such by States which have already ratified the Treaty of
Versailles, and therefore on an act left to the free will of each of the
Parties.49
44For text of the Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International
Concern, opened for signature at Barcelona, April 20, 1921 see 1 H DSoX, INTERNAoNAL.
LEGISLATiON, 638-644 (1931); Text of the Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways
of International Concern, of the same date, see id. at 645-659.
45 P.C.IJ., Ser. A, No. 23, p. 19 (1929).
46 Id. at 20.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Id. at 33.
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It appears thus that Judge Huber interpreted Article 338 of the Treaty
of Versailles as pactum de contrahendo,50 as a binding agreement to
agree on the new terms of a general convention. It may be added that
the parties who "drew up" the Barcelona Convention had wide discretion
in drafting its terms, since Article 338 of the Treaty of Versailles did
not lay down any specific standards with which the new convention was
to conform.
Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement between the United States
and the United Kingdom, signed on February 23, 1942, may illustrate
an agreement to agree which sets forth certain guiding principles with
which the future agreement has to conform."' In particular, it is agreed
to include in future agreements "provision for agreed action" by the
United States and the United Kingdom with a view to the elimination
of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, to
the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, and, in general, to the
attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Atlantic Charter
of August 14, 1941.
Article VII constituted the prototype of in substance identical
clauses which were subsequently inserted into bilateral Mutual Aid
(Lend-Lease) Agreements between the United States and other powers.
In addition, from 1942 to 1945 Article VII served as the focal point
of international discussions between the United States and other powers
50 Ibid. On pacture de contrahendo in international law see McNram, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 56-57 (1938). McNair states here that it is the view of the United Kingdom
Government that preliminary agreements to enter into a later and final agreement, if
expressed with sufficient precision, create valid obligations. McNair rightly adds the following
warning: "It is, however, necessary to distinguish between a true obligation to enter into a
later treaty and an obligation merely to embark upon negotiations for a later treaty and
to carry them on in good faith and with a genuine desire for their success." Id. at 57. See
also on this point the Opinion and Award of President Coolidge as Arbitrator in the so-
called Tacna-Arica Arbitration, March 4, 1925, in 19 A.m. J. INT'L L. 393-432 (1925),
especially the following statement at 398: "The agreement to make a special protocol with
undefined terms, did not mean that either party was bound to make an agreement un-
satisfactory to itself provided it did not act in bad faith." (Italics added). On the question
as to whether President Wilson's "Fourteen Points," embodied in his address to Congress of
January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses are
to be considered a pactum de contrahendo in reference to the Treaty of Versailles, see The
Treaty of Versailles and After, DEP'T OF STATE, CoXF. SER. No. 92, pp. 49, 51, 52, 54 (1947).
See on this point also 1 RoUssEAu, PRwciPEs GENRAUX Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
353-354 (1944) and the citations therein.
51 Text in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT SaR. No. 241 (1943); for a
discussion of this provision in reference to United States foreign economic policy see BROWN,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 48-49 (1950). For genesis of
Article VII see also PosTwAR FOREIGN PoLIcY PREPARATION, 1939-1945. DEr OF STATE,
GEN'L FOREIGN PoICY San. No. 15, pp. 54, n. 8, 83-84, 190-194, 463-464, 560-564 (1950).
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on proposed multi-lateral agreements relating to monetary, financial and
commercial matters. It no doubt influenced the formulation of Article
VIII, Section 3 of the Fund Agreement5 2 relating to the avoidance of
discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices as
well as the provisions of GATT relating to General-Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment (Article I), non-discriminatory administration of
quantitative restrictions (Article XIII) and non-discriminatory treat-
ment on the part of state trading enterprises (Article XVII). 3
Also, Article XV, Sections 6 and 7 of GATT5 4 may be considered a
pactum de contrazendo since it provides that contracting parties not
members of the International Monetary Fund shall enter into a special
exchange agreement with the contracting parties to GATT. The
terms of such a special exchange agreement shall not impose on the
contracting party obligations in exchange matters which would be more
restrictive than those which apply under the Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund to the members of the Fund. In
addition, such a-special exchange agreement shall expressly provide that
the objectives of the GATT will not be frustrated by the contracting party
as a result of action in exchange matters. Accordingly, Article XV,
Sections 6 and 7 impose on individual contracting parties which are not
members of the International Monetary Fund the obligation to agree to
a special exchange agreement the terms of which shall conform with cer-
tain guiding principles which are to'be found in GATT and/or the Fund
Agreement. 55
II. CONFLICT OF TREATIES OF THE SAM LEVEL WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO Inter Se ARRANGEMENTS
As previously indicated the maxim lex posterior derogat priori is, in
principle, applicable only if the later rule applies to the same subject as
well as to the same parties."6 In other words, application of the maxim
normally presupposes identity of the subject matter as well as identity
of all parties. In practice, however, the principle of the identity of
52 T.I.A.S. 1501 at 12.
53 See The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Amended Text), U.S. DEPT' or
STATE CoimmRacia PoLIcY SER. No. 124, pp. 2-3, 28-30, 37-38 (1950).
154 Id. at 34-36.
55 See, e.g., Special Exchange Agreement between the Government of Haiti and the
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done at London,
October 20, 1950. The text of this Agreement has been published by the United Nations as
a separate document (no date, no identification symbols) ; it is to be expected that it will
also be published in the UrmrD NATIoNs TREATY SERIEs.
56 See note 4 supra, and note 87 infra.
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parties, is applicable to questions of supersession if only several of the
parties to the treaties involved are, and even if only one party is identical.
In conjunction with multipartite treaties special problems arise if the
number of the parties to the later treaty is smaller than the number of
the parties to the earlier treaty, i.e., if the later treaty takes on the
character of an inter se arrangement or treaty. It is in these situations
that attention is most frequently focussed on the issue as to whether
or which parties to the earlier treaty are identical.
Here again two situations may be distinguished: (1) situations where
some of the parties to an earlier treaty conclude a new treaty but no
new party, i.e., a party which did not participate in the earlier multipartite
treaty, participates in the new treaty; this situation may be styled "inter
se treaty in the strict sense"; (2) situations where some of the parties
to an earlier treaty as well as "new parties" participate-this situation
may be styled "inter se treaty in the broader sense." It should be noted
that in the practice of states the foregoing distinction is not always
observed and that both types of treaties are frequently considered as
inter se treaties.
(A) Modification or Abrogation of Multipartite Treaty Without Con-
sent of All Original Parties. If several, but not all, of the contracting
parties to a multipartite treaty conclude subsequently another multi-
partite treaty whose substantive provisions are at variance with the
earlier treaty or if these parties disregard procedural safeguards of
the earlier treaty, e.g., by not securing the consent of all contracting
parties to the earlier treaty, the question may arise whether the later
treaty is valid.
1. In certain cases such inter se treaties have been declared invalid
on the ground that they run counter to an essential principle of in-
ternational law, i.e., the principle pacta sunt servanda and/or to the
provisions of the earlier more comprehensive treaty. In his dissenting
opinion in the Oscar Chinn case," for instance, Judge E ysinga, con-
sidered invalid the action taken in 1919 by some of the parties to the
General Act of Berlin (1885) and the Declaration of Brussels (1890)
whereby these parties replaced these instruments inter se through
signature and subsequent ratification of the Convention of Saint-Germain
(September 10, 1919). Judge Eysinga arrived at this conclusion on
the following grounds: first, Article 36 of the General Act of Berlin
expressly required "common accord," i.e., the consent of all Signatory
Powers, to any subsequent modification of the Act. Second, the parties
-5 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934).
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to the 1919 Convention acted contrary to an essential principle of in-
ternational law, which would apply "even if Article 36 had not existed."58
Third, the pre-1919 agreements do not constitute a jus dispositivum, but
a regime, a statute, a constitution for the Congo basin which forms an
indivisible whole and which may be modified only by agreement of all
contracting parties.5 9
2. Certain multilateral treaties expressly provide that subsequent
inter se treaties shall be valid for the consenting parties only, while the
parties to the original multilateral treaty, which do not consent to the
subsequent treaty, may still consider the earlier treaty as binding. Thus
Article 91 of the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes states that the present convention, when duly ratified, shall
replace as between the contracting parties the 1899 Hague Convention
relating to the same subject.60
A clause of this type which has been inserted into a considerable
number of multilateral treaties concluded after 1900 obviously constitutes
a compromise between the principle that a multilateral treaty may be
modified only with the unanimous consent of all contracting parties, and
the other view which in effect authorizes a limited number of the con-
tracting parties to a multilateral treaty to terminate such a treaty.61
3. Certain multilateral treaties, although concluded only by some
of the contracting parties to the corresponding earlier treaty, may be
considered effective vis-4-vis all parties to the earlier treaty, even vis-
h-vis those that have not consented.
In this connection it should be recalled that there are two principles
of customary international law which, if applied without qualification,
would deny the validity of inter se arrangements between some, but not
all of the contracting parties to a multipartite agreement. The one
principle (pacta sunt servanda) interdicts the conclusion of a treaty
between States A and B without the consent of State C, if the treaty
between A and B would in effect be at variance with previous treaty
obligations of A or B toward C. The other principle (pacta tertiis ne
nocent ne prosunt) may in practice lead to at least two legal conse-
58 Id. at 134; the principle of international law which is invoked here is presumably the
principle pacta sunt servanda.
59 Id. at 134; the last of Judge Eysinga's reasons assumes that the regime of the Congo
basin as established in the last decades of the 19th century is to be considered as "higher
law" as compared with other treaties; see also infra. p. 685, note 101.
60 Text of the 1907 Convention in ScoTT, THE HAouE. CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATiONS OF
1899 and 1907 41-81 (1915). See also Article 168 of the Sanitary Convention, opened for
signature at Paris, June 21, 1926 in 3 Hu)soN, INTERNATIoNAL LEGISLATION 1972 (1931).
61 See also the proposed Amendment to Article XXIX of GATT, note 33 supra.
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quences: (1) the party to the earlier multilateral treaty which has not
consented to the later treaty may consider the later treaty as invalid; or
(2) the later treaty may be considered as invalid vis-h-vis all states
(erga omnes) on the ground that it has been concluded in violation of a
binding principle of international law. However that may be, there is
evidence in the practice of states that multilateral treaties have been re-
placed by later treaties concluded between some but not all the contract-
ing parties to the earlier treaty and that these treaties have nevertheless
been considered effective vis-h-vis all parties, even vis-&-vis those which
have not consented, and despite the absence of an express clause in the
earlier pact authorizing the modification inter se by some but not all
the contracting parties.
In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries numerous inter
se arrangements have been concluded between the Great Powers which
in effect superseded preceding treaties on the same subject. Such arrange-
ments are, of course, exceptions to the principle of the "equality of
states," in that the consent of the Great Powers suffices to amend or
modify an earlier treaty, irrespective of the consent of the other parties.
Thus the requirement of unanimous consent to the amending of multi-
lateral treaties gave way to one which lends greater weight to the consent
of the Great Powers and recognizes the special interest of these powers
in the settlement of specific questions.' This trend is illustrated in the
practice of states of recognizing as valid, or at least acquiescing in the
validity of multilateral treaties which have been concluded without the
consent of all the parties to an earlier treaty on the same subject. 3
Perhaps the most widely known example of abrogation of a multilateral
treaty without the consent of all the contracting parties is the Munich
Agreement of September 29, 1938, which abrogated inter alia Article 82
of the Treaty64 of Versailles, which determined the frontier between
62 On this trend in the "public law and Concert of Europe" see ToBiN, THE TERmNA-
Tio or Mu nsARiT TarnEAs 244 (1933). Tobin holds that in practice there have been
numerous deviations from the requirement of unanimous consent to the termination of
multipartite treaties, but that up to the nineteenth century the question was of minor
importance. Beginning with the nineteenth century, however, "Failure of one or more
signatories of a treaty to participate in a revision need not render that revision invalid,"
was considered as one of the basic principles involved in the concept of the public law and
Concert of Europe. Id. at 225.
63 See also the principles concerning the modification of earlier multilateral treaties set
forth in ToBiN, op. cit. supra, at 225. For examples of modification or abrogation of the
provisions of multipartite treaties without the consent of all the original parties see also,
Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta sunt Servanda, 39 Ae. J. INTIL L.
193 (1945) especially n. 35, 36.
64 Article 82 reads:
The old frontier as it existed on August 3, 1914, between Austria-Hungary and the
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Czechoslovakia and Germany. By this Agreement, France, Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom modified Article 82 of the Treaty of
Versailles at the expense of Czechoslovakia without securing the consent
of either Czechoslovakia, or the other parties to the Treaty of Versailles. 65
Although its legality has been questioned by many, the Munich Agree-
ment entered into force, temporarily at least.
From a legal viewpoint, the practice of inter se agreements of the Great
Powers is noteworthy also because it evidences that in treaty law the
principle that a treaty cannot confer rights or impose obligations upon
states which have not consented to it may be subject to significant ex-
ceptions and qualifications.66
4. Certain multilateral treaties contain an express provision for
modification or amendment by the majority of the contracting parties
or by the consent of specifically mentioned contracting parties. Ac-
cordingly, such changes are effective also vis-h-vis the dissenting minority.
Thus Article 14 of the Postal Union Convention, in force since July 1,
1930, in effect permitted repeal of Acts of the preceding Congress of the
Union by majority vote. Under this Article the members of the Union
did not have the choice of ratifying the new provision or being bound
by the old. The revised Convention came into effect on the date fixed by
the Congress-usually twelve to eighteen months after the Congress-
German Empire will constitute the frontier between Germany and the Czecho-Slovak
State.
For text and comment see The Treaty of Versailles and After, DEP'r STATE, CoNp. SER.
No. 92, p. 203 (1947).
65 See on this point also Prime Minister Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons
(September 28, 1938):
I cannot help reflecting that if Article XIX of the [League of Nations) Covenant
providing for the revision of the Treaties by agreement had been put into operation,
as was contemplated by the framers of the Covenant, instead of waiting until passions
became so exasperated that revision by agreement became impossible, we might have
avoided the crisis. (Italics added).
Quoted from 2 DOcUmENTs ON INTERNATIONAL AStAIs, 1938, 273 (1943). For
text of the Munich Agreement see Id. at 289-290. See also Wright, The Munick Settlement
and International Law, 33 Am. J. I rNT'L L. 14-18 (1939) and ARmsTRONo, WHEN THERE Is
No PEACE: (1939), passim.
66 See on this point 1I OPPENHEI, INTERNATIONAL LAw (7th ed.: Lauterpacht, 1948).
See especially p. 834. Lauterpacht states here that Article 2, paragraph 6 of the United Nations
Charter which provides that the United Nations shall ensure that States which are not
members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles set forth in Article 2,
paragraphs 1-5 in so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security is a mandatory provision which is effective vis-h-vis non-members of the United
Nations. See on this point also KFrsEN, THE LAW OF HE UNITED NATIONS 85-86, 106-110
(1950). For a discussion of the question of the effect of treaties on third states see also
RoussEAu, PiNqcpEs GENERAUX Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 452-484 (1944).
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and was then binding on all members, except those which withdrew from
the Union. 67
The amendment provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund constitute a combination of the majority and
the unanimity rules. Under Article XVII(a)68 of the Fund Agreement
amendments to the Agreement require concurrence of three fifths of
the members, having four-fifths of the total voting power. Such amend-
ments shall enter into force for all members within the time prescribed
in Article XVII(c). Under Article XVII(b) of the Fund Agreement,
however, unanimous consent is required in the case of an amendment
which modifies the right to withdraw from the Fund '(Article XV, Section
1); the provision that no change shall be made in a member's quota
without its consent (Article III, Section 2); and the provision that no
change may be made in the par value of a member's currency except
on the proposal of that member (Article IV, Section 5 (b)).
Also, Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 9 provides that within the
time prescribed in Article VIII(c) amendments shall enter into force
for all members if approved by three-fifths of the members having four-
fifths of the total voting power. Unanimous approval is required in case
an amendment modifies the right to withdraw from the Bank under
Article VI, Section 1, the right of a member not to subscribe to capital
stock of the Bank which is due to increase in the Bank's capital in ac-
cordance with Article II, Section 3; or the rule of Article II, Section
67 Article 14 of the Postal Union Convention in force since July 1, 1930 and Article 15
of the Universal Postal Union Convention, signed at Paris July 5, 1947 read
1. The Acts of Congresses are ratified as soon as possible, and the ratifications are
communicated to the government of the country where the Congress was held, and
by that government to the governments of the contracting countries. 2. In the event
that one or more of the contracting countries should not ratify one or another of
the Acts signed by them, the latter would nevertheless be valid for the countries which
have ratified them. 3. Those Acts are put into effect simultaneously and have the same
duration. 4. As of the date fixed for the entry into force of the Acts adopted by a
Congress, all the Acts of the preceding Congress are abrogated. (Italics added).
T.IA.S. 1850 at 161, French original version, id. at 15. See also Ricnxs, MAJoRIY RxLE
IN INTERxATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1940) who comments on the application of Article 14
(of the 1930 Convention) as follows:
In actual practice, all administrations start applying the revised convention and regula-
tions on the date fixed by the Congress [i.e., of the Universal Postal Union] for their
entering into force without taking into consideration the extent to which ratifications
have been deposited. Indeed, although the Convention and Regulations revised at
London entered into force for all members of the Union Eon] July 1, 1930, twenty-one
states, among them Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, did not deposit ratifications
until 1931 and several had not ratified by the time of the Congress in Cairo in 1934.
The practice of the Union in this respect is admittedly extra-legal.
Id. at 73.
68 For text of Article XVII of the Fund Agreement see T.I.A.S. 1501, pp. 24-25.
69 For text of Article VIII of the Bank Agreement see T.IA.S. 1502, pp. 22-23.
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6 that the liability on shares shall be limited to the unpaid portion of
the issue price of the shares.
Similarly, Article 108 of the United Nations Charter provides that
amendments to the Charter become effective if adopted by a two-thirds
of the members of the General Assembly" and ratified by two-thirds of
the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members
of the Security Council. In other words, amendments to the Charter are
binding upon all non-permanent members of the United Nations, even
upon those which voted against them or which abstained from voting on
these amendments. The majority principle, however, is not effective
vis-h-vis the permanent members of the Security Council whose "concur-
ring votes 1 71 constitute an indispensable prerequisite for the adoption
and effectiveness of amendments to the Charter.
5. Certain treaties permit revision or amendment only after a con-
ference for this purpose has been convened. Such a conference may be
authorized to decide on amendments by majority vote. Thus, under
Section 48 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies,72 the Secretary-General of the United Nations is
required to convene a conference for the purpose of revising of the
Convention, whenever one-third of the parties to the Convention makes
a request to this effect. Article 109 of the United Nations Charter
provides that a General Conference of the Members of the United
Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter as adopted on June
26, 1945, in San Francisco, shall be convoked whenever two-thirds of
the members of the General Assembly and seven members of the
70 On Article 108, see GOODRICH & HARIBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 537-539
(2d ed. 1949):
There can be no doubt whatever that Members which vote against proposed amend-
ments and refuse to ratify them are bound by them if they are ratified by two-thirds
of the Members, inclusive of the states with permanent membership on the Council.
Id. at 539. In this connection it is noteworthy that in contrast to the Covenant of the
League of Nations, and to the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and Fund, the United
Nations Charter does not contain any express provision permitting members to withdraw.
See on this point GOODRICH & HA BRO, Id. at 142-145, 539; and KELSEN, THE LAW oF
THE UNITED NATIONS 122-135 (1950).
71 On the meaning of "concurring votes" in Article 27, 13 of the United Nations
Charter see Gross, Voting in the Securitly Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence
from Meetings, 60 YALE L.J. 209-210 (1951). McDougall and Gardner, The Veto and
the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258-292 (1951), disagree with
the interpretation by Gross and favor an interpretation that "concurring votes" means
"concurring votes of the permanent members who participate in the voting." Id. at 273.
By contrast, Gross maintains that under Article 27, ff3 "the affirmative vote of all the
five permanent members is required in addition to the affirmative vote of two elected
members." Id. at 210.
72 For text of the Convention see 33 U.N. TREATY Smre 261-303 (1949).
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Security Council so request. In case no such conference has been held
before the Tenth Annual Session of the General Assembly, that is pre-
sumably before 1955, the question whether such a General Conference
shall be held shall be placed on the Agenda of the Tenth General As-
sembly to convoke the Conference may be taken by a majority vote of
the General Assembly with the concurrence of seven members of the
Security Council.
(B) Are inter se treaties concluded by some of the parties to the
original treaty valid if they comply with certain standards? The Harvard
Draft Convention on Treaties suggests in Article 22 (b) that subsequent
inter se treaties between some of the parties to an earlier multilateral
treaty are valid on two conditions: (1) if the conclusion of such a
treaty "is not forbidden by the provisions of the earlier treaty"; (2) if
"the later treaty is not so inconsistent with the general purpose
of the earlier treaty as to be likely to frustrate that purpose." 3
This rule reflects positive international law and is not merely a rule
de lege ferenda if the first condition is understood to refer to the pro-
cedure of amending or modifying the original treaty, and if the second
condition is understood to refer to a substantive provision in the later
treaty which makes performance of the earlier treaty impossible. 4 As
for individual substantive provisions it may be difficult to determine
which provisions of a later treaty are implicitly or explicitly "forbidden"
by the earlier treaty. Moreover, in an actual case it may be controversial
whether the later treaty conflicts with the earlier, because it is incom-
patible with the specific terms, or because it is incompatible with the
''purposes" of the earlier treaty.
The Austro-German Customs Regime case' may serve to illustrate
this problem. In this case the Permanent Court of International Justice,
at the request of the Council of the League of Nations, was called upon
to render an Advisory Opinion on the question whether a proposed
customs union between Germany and Austria is compatible with prior
multilateral treaty commitments of Austria, in particular, whether it was
compatible with Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and a Geneva
Protocol No. I, signed on October 4, 1922.
Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain provided:
The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent
of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes
7-3 Research in International Law (Harvard Law School), Draft Convention on the Law
of Treaties, in supplement to 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 653, 1017 (1935).
74 See on this point also infra footnote 83.
7-5 P.CI.J., Ser. A/B No. 41 (1931).
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in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act
which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise
her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of
the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power.'8
Similarly by Geneva Protocol No. I Austria undertook, in accordance
with Article 88, to abstain from negotiations which would compromise
her independence and
that she shall not violate her economic independence by granting to any
State a special regime or exclusive advantages calculated to threaten her
independence. 77
By eight votes to seven the Court held that the proposed customs
regime "would not be compatible with Protocol No. I signed at Geneva
on October 4th, 1922."I s Although the Opinion of the Court stated that
strictly speaking Austria's independence was not endangered by the
proposed regime79 the proposed customs union was deemed objectionable
on the ground that it constituted a "special regime" affording Germany,
in relation to Austria, advantages which were withheld from third
Powers.8" It should be added that six judges of the majority considered
the proposed customs union not only incompatible with the above men-
tioned Geneva Protocol, but also at variance with Article 88 of the
Treaty of Saint-Germain.
By contrast, the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Adatci, Kellogg,
Rolin-Jaequemyns, Hurst, Schiicking, Eysinga, Wang stated that none
of the provisions of the Vienna Protocol of March 19, 1931, "when con-
sidered individually, are inconsistent with the maintenance of Austria's
position as a separate and independent State," and that the regime as a
whole did "not prejudice the independence of Austria."'" The Joint Dis-
senting Opinion concluded furthermore that the proposed regime did not
meet the test of Article 88, since special regimes were proscribed only
if calculated to threaten Austria's independence.8 2
Generally speaking, one may be able to find more examples for treaties
or treaty provisions permitting special agreements inter se than those
expressly prohibiting such agreements. If the earlier treaty lays down
certain standards for inter se treaties, the later treaty has to be inter-
preted in the light of these standards. But even in the absence of any
76 Id. at 9.
77 Id. at 10.
78 Id. at 53.
79 Id. at 52.
80 Ibid.
81 Id. at 86.
82 Id. at 81-82. See also on this point Judge Anzilotti's dissenting opinion, id. at 66-70.
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express permissions or prohibitions in the earlier treaty the later treaty
may always be scrutinized by reference to the earlier treaty.'
III. THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE AND THE MAXIM "THE
LATER LAW SUPERSEDES THE EARLIER LAW."
In the context of this study it should be emphasized that the operation
of the most-favored-nation clause constitutes but a special application
of the principle lex posterior derogat priori. To the extent that the
clause provides that a Treaty between State A and State B may subse-
quently be modified by a future Treaty between State B and C, the
clause says in effect that the later treaty between B and C, supersedes
the earlier between A and B. This inherent time element in the clause,"'
although of great legal significance, has frequently been ignored in the
discussion of the clause.
At times the question has been posed whether the equality of treat-
ment which is granted to the contracting parties in a most-favored-nation
clause applies only to concessions existing at the moment of conclusion
of a treaty or also to all concessions which may be granted in the future."
One school of thought holds that extension of future benefits must be
expressly stated in the clause; in other words, the parties must expressly
pledge that they will accord all benefits which are granted at present
and those which may hereafter be granted. By contrast others hold, and
this appears to be the correct view, "that most favored nations treatment
must mean equality at all times. 86 If this view is adopted, it becomes
clear beyond doubt that the extension of benefits by a later treaty con-
cluded between States B and C affects and modifies the scope and content
of the concessions made in an earlier treaty between States A and B. In
other words, the later treaty-provided it covers the same subject and
provided furthermore that at least one party is identical-in our example
83 See, however, Article 18 of the 1928 Havana Convention on Treaties providing: "Two
or more States may agree that their relations are to be governed by rules other than those
established in general conventions celebrated [sic] by them with other states." (Italics
added). This provision has been frequently referred to as a clause authorizing inter se
treaties without condition or restriction and without regard to the effect which such
treaties may have on the earlier multipartite treaties. Text in 4 HunsoN, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATiON 2383 (1931). See on this clause, Harvard Draft Convention, op. cit. supra
note 73, at 1016, and Kunz, The Meaning and Range of the Norm Pacta sunt Servanda,
39 Am. J. INT'L L. 191 (1945).
84 On most-favored-nation treatment in general see SNYDER, THE MosT-FAvoRED-NATo
CLAUSE (1948).
85 Id. at 34f.
s8 Id. at 35; see also Visser, La Clause de la Nation la Plus Favorisie dans les Traits
de Commerce, 4 REvuE DE DROIT INTERNATIoNAL 83 (2d Ser. 1902).
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State B-modifies the earlier treaty. The effective modification of the
earlier treaty may be explained by reference to the nature and intention
of the most-favored-nation clause. In any case, the significance and
effectiveness of the most-favored-nation clause can be fully appreciated
only if it is recognized that the clause has to be interpreted in con-
junction with the principle that the later rule supersedes the earlier rule
(lex posterior derogat priori) which, in turn, is applicable only to rules
covering the same subject matter (in pari materia).m
It may be added that the most-favored-nation clause is perhaps the
most striking exception to the alleged principle of international law that
treaties do not legally affect third states (pacta tertiis nec prosunt nec
nocent).s8 For, in law and practice one of the primary purposes of the
most-favored-nation clause is to secure equality of treatment by extend-
ing to State A all those benefits which State B subsequently accords to
State C without necessitating the conclusion of a treaty between States
A and C. Very often it is expressly stated in the clause that benefits of
later treaties shall "immediately" be accorded to parties to earlier treaties.
The benefits accruing by means of the most-favored-nation clause to
State A through the grant of new benefits by State B to State C are neces-
sarily contingent benefits, that is to say, contingent on benefits accorded
to third states. It is thus conceivable that in practice the most-favored-
nation clause remains a dead letter and that State A never will benefit
from it, if State B does not subsequently conclude any treaty with third
states which contains more benefits than those accorded by State B in
its earlier treaty with State A. In this case, the most-favored-nation
clause is at best dormant law; it becomes operative only if State B
grants to third States benefits over and above those previously accorded
to State A.
Since, as previously indicated, claims to equal treatment which are
based on the most-favored-nation clause are contingent claims, it may
be inferred that contraction as well as expansion of the scope of the
clause may ensue in the course of time. Here again the time element is
significant. Suppose new benefits have been granted to State C by agree-
ment with State B and furthermore that these benefits are subsequently
87 On the in pari materia rule in reference to the most-favored-nation clause see National
Provincial Bank v. Dollfus (1947) in LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF
PuBLIc INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, YEAR 1947 (1951). "But a most-favored-nation clause
can only be invoked if the subject matter of the treaty containing it is identical with that
of the particularly favourable treaty the benefit of which is claimed." Id. at 166.
88 In favor of the view that the most-favored-nation clause is closely related to the
question of the effect of treaties on third states see 1 GUOGENnar, LEHRDUCH DES VdLKER-
RECHTS 96 (1948).
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withdrawn or limited by termination of modification of that agreement,
such modification of benefits affects, of course, State A which, as an
indirect beneficiary of the most-favored-nation treatment, participates
in the extension as well as in the limitation of benefits which are accorded
to third states under the most-favored-nation clause. 9
The view has been advanced, however, that the most-favored-nation
clause does not constitute a genuine exception to the pacta tertii rule,
since there appears to be an intent, at least on the part of one of the
signatories of the earlier treaty (of which the clause constitutes an in-
tegral part) that subsequent treaties (to which this signatory is not a
party), shall nonetheless affect the earlier treaty." This is, of course,
correct. On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that State A can
only derive benefits from State B under the clause, if State B subse-
quently concludes a treaty with State C which includes benefits over
and above those previously accorded to State A. Actually, State A can-
not legally insist that State B conclude a treaty with C, so as to make
the clause operative; nor can State A legally prevent termination of
such a treaty between States B and C, which termination, in turn, renders
the clause ineffective. In addition, States B and C have, even under most-
favored-nation arrangements, usually wide discretion in conceding to
each other particular substantive benefits as well as to withdraw them,
whereas State A has no direct influence on the scope and content of the
substantive concessions agreed upon by States B and C. In short, al-
though the most-favored-nation clause cannot exclusively be considered
as res inter alios acta, since State A gives thereby, though in very general
terms, its advance consent to certain subsequent arrangements between
B and C, the clause becomes operative only if subsequently an'agreement
is concluded between States B and C to which State A, by definition, is
not a party. Accordingly some of the major legal and economic charac-
teristics of the most-favored-nation-clause should be seen in those ele-
ments which partake in the specific criteria of a res inter alios acta,
rather than in the more formal and, in this write r's view, secondary
feature of an advance consent to certain subsequent treaty arrangements.
Moreover, it may be argued that to the extent that State A agrees with
89 See on this point 1 A.zIomu, CoUxs DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL 437-438 (1929) and
LIPPERT, CODE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW § 53, p. 118 (1935). In time of war,
however, benefits granted to belligerent powers prior to the outbreak of war may be dis-
continued vis-a-vis the belligerent powers, but maintained vis-a-vis neutral powers. See
on this point Awzmomn and LIPPRT, op. cit. supra.
10 See on this point RossEAu, PNmcrpEs GgNE-gEAUx Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
465 (1944).
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State B on a most-favored-nation clause, such agreement constitutes a
pledge on the part of State A not to protest vis-h-vis State B against
subsequent modifications of its agreement with State B, through agree-
ment between States B and C, provided these modifications are compatible
with the most-favored-nation clause.
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN T1REATIES OF DIFFERENT LEVELS
(A) League of Nations Covenant and United Nations Charter as the
"Higher Law". Even in the field of treaty law at least two different
levels may be distinguished as evidenced by the hierarchical structure
of the League of Nations91 and United Nations92 legal system. Article
20 (1) of the League of Nations Covenant provides:
The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted
as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are incon-
sistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not
hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.
Similarly, Article 103 of the United Nations Charter reads:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.
Whereas Article 20 of the Covenant "abrogates" all obligations inter
se inconsistent with the terms thereof, Article 103 states that the obli-
91 See on this point Lauterpacht, The Covenant as the "Higher Law," 17 BRaIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 54 (1936).
92 See GooD crc & HA=Ro, CRET.ER or TnE UNITED NATIONS 517-519 (2d ed. 1949)
for a discussion of the United Nations Charter as "basic law of the international com-
munity." See also Ross, CoxsTiTuToN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 30-40 (1950). Ross states
"that in a systematic respect the Charter is a constitution." Id. at 36. He bases this
contention primarily on the amendment procedure of Article 108. See also KrEsEN, TE
LAw oF Tim UNITED NATiONS 111-121 (1950). See furthermore, I.CJ., REPARATION FOR
INxums S ERED INr SERvIcE oF THE UNITED NATIONS (Advisory Opinion, April 11,
1949):
• . . the Court's opinion is that fifty states, representing the vast majority of the
members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with inter-
national law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international person-
ality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to
bring international claims. (Italics added).
Id. at 15.
See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez in I.CJ., Reservations to the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion, May
28, 1951). Judge Alvarez, after referring to several categories of multilateral conventions,
states that these categories present characteristics
which differentiate them markedly from ordinary multilateral conventions. To begin
with, they have a universal character; they are in a sense, the Constitution of interna-
tional society, the new international constitutional law. (Italics added).
Id. at 51.
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gations under the Charter "shall prevail." It appears that the authors
of the United Nations Charter replaced "abrogate" by "prevail" with
the intent (1) to cover not only conflicts between the Charter and earlier
treaties-the term "abrogate" is usually applied to this situation-but
also to conflict between the charter and later treaties; (2) to avoid the
impression that an "obligation" which is at variance with the United
Nations Charter, including of course a treaty obligation, is deemed "auto-
matically" abrogated. In other words, the conflicting treaty is to be
considered voidable rather than void.93
In any case, the distinction between treaties of different levels is of
special significance in reference to the maxim lex posterior deragat priori,
since in effect it may reverse this rule. In general, a later treaty super-
sedes an earlier only if (1) it is on the same level as the earlier treaty,
(2) or if it is on a higher level than the rule which it supersedes, e.g., in
a conflict between a later treaty and earlier statute. By contrast, a later
treaty may not abrogate an earlier treaty if it is on a lower level than
the earlier treaty. This principle is in line with general principles of
constitutional law, for instance, with the ruling of Chief Justice Marshall
in Marbury v. Madison.94 The principle is inherent in the hierarchic
structure of the legal order.
A decision whether in a given case, the later or the earlier law prevails
is usually based on the consideration whether or not the later law is on
the same level as the earlier one. It is this consideration which deter-
mines the choice between the maxims lex posterior derogat priori and
the opposite principle lex prior derogat posteriori.93 In other words, a
93 See on this point the Report of Committee IV/2 of the San Francisco Conference,
Doc. 933, 13 U.N. CoNp. Doe. 703, 707 (1945):
. . . the Committee has concluded that it is necessary to incorporate in the Charter
a provision regarding inconsistency between the obligation of members under other
treaties and under the Charter itself, if only because the omission of such a provision
could give rise to inaccurate interpretations. Moreover, it has decided that it would
be inadvisable to provide for the automatic abrogation by the Charter of obligations
inconsistent with the terms thereof.
94 See Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803):
The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be
true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part
be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people,
to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
95 See on this point KELSEm, Tnn LAW OF T=s UNTED NATIoNs 112 (1950):
It is, however, possible that a treaty establishes the contrary principle: Lex prior
derogat posteriori, that is to say that a later treaty (concluded by the same parties)
shall be null and void if incompatible with the first treaty.
It is submitted that even in the absence of an express provision in a treaty the earlier
law may prevail, if the earlier treaty may be considered as being of a higher level than
the later treaty and/or, if the later treaty consists only of special rules which are but
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later rule of the lower level may not abrogate an earlier rule of a higher
level.
(B) International "constitutions" and rules of the subconstitutional
level. The major international institutions have been established by virtue
of their respective "organic laws." The terms "Covenant" and "Charter"
have been deliberately selected to add special dignity and legal signifi-
cance to the "organic law" of the League of Nations96 and of the United
Nations.97
The "organic laws" or "basic instruments" of the major international
institutions, especially the Covenant of the League of Nations and the
Charter of the United Nations, reflect a certain tendency to confer the
character of a "rigid constitution" on these charters. The major features
of such rigidity are: (1) the clause that agreements inter se which
conflict with the basic charter are voidable;98 (2) special procedural
provisions concerning amendments to the basic charter; (3) charter obli-
gations are obligations of members toward the organization rather than
obligations of members vis-ht-vis each other; (4) provisions that in
relation to non-members the members of an international organization
will be guided by the principles of the basic charter.99
International treaties which conflict with the pertinent provisions of
the basic charter may therefore be declared "unconstitutional." Such a
finding may be made by the organ which is authorized to interpret the
constitution of an international organization. For example Article XVIII
of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and
Article IX of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development confer, in principle, the final authority
to interpret these agreements upon the Executive Directors of the Fund
and Bank, subject to review by the Board of Governors of these insti-
supplementary to the earlier treaty. On this latter point see note 142 infra, and 1 GuGGEN-
nxm, LEH BUCHr DES VOLHERRECHTS 134-135 (1948).
96 On Woodrow Wilson's emphasis on the religious implications of the term "Covenant,"
see his Kansas City Address (September, 1919), quoted in 1 BAxER, WOODROW WILsON
AND WORLD SrmEENT 213 (1922):
My ancestors were troublesome Scotchmen and among them were some of that
famous group that were known as Covenanters. Very well, there is the Covenant of
the League of Nations. I am a Covenanter.
97 The term "charter" has its roots in "carta." In early Franco-Germanic and Anglo-
Saxon law a "carta" was considered an instrument of special evidentiary force; see article
"Carta" in 2 Du CANOE, GLossaPiux MEDIAE ET INin&AE LATINiTATIS 192 (1883-1887).
On the conclusive effect of certain "charters," HoLivs, Tnm ComoN LAW 272 (1946);
see also 2 MuRRAY, NEW ENGLISr DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRMICPHLES, part 1, p. 294
(1893).
98 See supra p. 683, note 93.
S9 See note 66 supra.
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tutions. By contrast, the United Nations Charter does not confer on
any one organ of the United Nations the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret
the United Nations Charter. Any one of the principal organs of the
United Nations may interpret the relevant provisions of the Charter.' 0
However that may be, the International Court of Justice is by Article
92 of the Charter designated as "the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations." In particular, the International Court of Justice is the
only organ whose decisions take on the form of a "judgment" or of an
"advisory opinion." The Court applies "international conventions whether
general or particular" (Article 38(1) (a) of the Statute of the Court).
Moreover, under the so-called optional clause the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court is recognized in all legal disputes concerning the interpre-
tation of a treaty (Article 36(2) (a) of the Statute of the Court). Accord-
ingly, the Court is competent to deal with the interpretation and the
interrelationship of several treaties, since it is assumed that the word
"treaty" is used in a generic sense in Article 36(2) (a) of its Statute.
Moreover, the Court, under Article 38(1) of its Statute, is competent to
determine the relative significance of a special convention as compared
with a general convention.
Actually, conflicts between inter se arrangements and controlling inter-
national constitutions are rarely discussed in terms of the "constitution-
ality" or "unconstitutionality" of the conflicting rules. The problems
usually present themselves as conflict between two or more bilateral or
multilateral treaties. Nevertheless, the reasoning by which such conflicts
are resolved often resembles closely the reasoning applied in settling
disputes on the constitutionality of domestic measures in accordance
with the constitutional law of individual states.' In particular, the
reversal of the maxim lex posterior derogat priori into its logical opposite
whereby the earlier law prevails over the later law'0 2 can perhaps best
be understood by reference to analogous principles of constitutional law.
100 On this point see United Nations Conference on International Organization, Report
of Committee IV/2, Doc. 933, 13 U.N. CoNt. Doc. 703, 709 (1949), reprinted in SOHN,
CASFS AND OER MATERmS Ow WORLD LAW 57-58 (1950). See also Pollux, The Inter-
pretation of the Charter, 23 BaiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 54 (1946).
101 See on this point the Separate Opinion of Jonkheer van Eysinga in the Oscar Chinn
case (P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63) p. 133:
The General Act of Berlin does not create a number of contractual relations between
a number of states, relations which may be replaced as regards some of these States
by other contractual relations it does not constitute a jus dispositivum, but it provides
the Congo Basin with a regime, a statute, a constitution. This regime, which forms
an indivisible whole, may be modified, but for this the agreement of all contracting
Powers is required. An inextricable legal tangle would result if, for instance, it were
held that the regime of neutralization provided for in Article II of the General Act
of Berlin might be in force for some contracting Powers while it bad ceased to
operate for certain others.
102 See note 95 supra.
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(C) Scope of the jurisdiction of individual international organizations.
In addition to conflicts between multilateral treaties on the constitu-
tional level and multilateral or bilateral treaties on the sub-constitu-
tional level, there may be jurisdictional conflicts between various
constitutions of intergovernmental organizations.
The great increase of the number of inter-governmental organizations
since 1920, and more particularly since 1944, increases the possibility,
if not probability of such conflicts. These conflicts may result in con-
flicting obligations of members vis-h-vis the various inter-governmental
organizations in which they participate or they may be conflicts between
the organizations proper.
1. Obligations of members. From the viewpoint of the members of
these organizations it is significant that their constitutions are not con-
fined to the determination of the structure and functions of international
organizations per se. On the contrary, they also determine the powers
of these organizations vis-h.-vis their members as well as the obligations
of individual members vis-h-vis the organizations.
It is obvious that any conflict between the individual provisions or
the general purpose of these constitutions may subject the members of
these organizations to conflicting obligations, a situation which is apt to
result in international disorganization rather than in international order.
Certain international agreements or clauses provide expressly for
"uniformity of obligations." Thus, the "standard clauses" (Articles II
to IX) of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations are designed to ensure uniform obligations of the
members in matters relating to the privileges and immunities of
specialized agencies.'13
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) may be cited
as an example of an agreement which tends to ensure farreaching
assimilation of the obligations of contracting parties to GATT which
are not members of the International Monetary Fund with those of the
members of the Fund. To this end, non-members of the Fund which are
parties to GATT are required by Article XV, paragraph 6 to enter "into
a special exchange agreement with the Contracting Parties."' 4 Article
XV, paragraph 7 (b) of GATT is, designed to harmonize as far as feasible
the obligations of members and non-members of the Fund: it provides
that the terms of such a special exchange agreement shall not impose on
the contracting party obligations in exchange matters which are gener-
103 See the preamble to this Convention in 33 U. N. T"IArY SmE. 261-303 (1949); see
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/191, pp. 1-3 (1947).
10 See GATT edition, note 33 supra, pp. 61-62.
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ally more restrictive than those imposed by the Fund Agreement on
members of the Fund.
In general, there is every indication that the multiplicity of the
specialized agencies is intended to create parallel rather than mutually
conflicting obligations of the members. There may even be a presumption,
though a rebuttable one, that membership in the various specialized
agencies does not entail conflicting obligations for the members. This'
presumption may be deemed reinforced in those instances where joint
membership is in principle required such as in the Bank and Fund.",
2. Co-operation between and co-ordination of specialized and other
agencies. The co-operation between the major international organizations
is to be insured by various legal techniques. Thus the charters of most
of the specialized agencies which have been set up after 1944 contain
general clauses on co-operation with other international organizations' 6
Several constitutions of international organizations, and in particular
the Charter of the United Nations, designate expressly certain organs as
being charged with fostering such co-operation.
(i) The role of the principal organs of the United Nations.' Co-
ordination between the United Nations and the specialized agencies is,
by virtue of Article 63, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, ex-
pressly entrusted to the Economic and Social Council (hereafter occa-
sionally referred to as ECOSOC). This Council may "coordinate the
activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recom-
mendations to such agencies." In addition, the Council may make recom-
mendations to this end to the General Assembly and to the Members of
the United Nations. The General Assembly in turn may make recom-
mendations"0 7 to the Economic and Social Council for the purpose of
co-ordinating the policies and activities of the specialized agencies. 08
Thus the primary responsibility for co-ordination is conferred on the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. In principle,
the power to make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies
05 See Article II, Section 1 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development which in effect makes membership in the Fund a
prerequisite for membership in the Bank. T.I.AS. 1502, p. 2.
106 See, for example, Article X of the Fund Agreement, T.I.A.S. 1501, p. 16, Article V,
Section 8 of the Bank Agreement, T.I.A.S. 1502, p. 15; Article X of the Constitution of
UNESCO, 4 U.N. TREATY SEa. 290 (1947); Article XII of the Constitution of FAO
T.I.A.S. 1554, p. 6; Article 12 of the Constitution of the ILO, 15 U.N. TRATY SER. 60
(1948).
107 See, e.g., UmrED NATIONS CHARTER Art. 13 (b) and Art. 60.
108 Article 58 of the United Nations Charter confers implicitly this power on the
General Assembly; see also Article 17, 13 and Article 60 of the Charter.
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and activities of the United Nations is also bestowed on other organs,
since under Article 58 of the Charter it is "the Organization" which
shall make such recommendations. Of the principal organs of the United
Nations other than the General Assembly and the Economic and Social
Council, it is the Secretariat °9 and the International Court of Justice"'
(rather than the Security Council"' and the Trusteeship Council) whose
co-ordinating activities are at times noteworthy.
The procedural requirement that agreements between the United
Nations and the specialized agencies may be "entered into" by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council" 2 and are "subject to the approval by the
General Assembly" clearly indicates the special role which in this field
has been assigned to the Council and to the General Assembly. More-
over, the Agreements between the United Nations and individual special-
ized agencies usually contain a clause that any formal agreement between
two or several specialized agencies shall be submitted to the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations for information as to their
nature and scope, before they are concluded in final form."
(ii) Other organs of co-ordination. In addition to the principal
organs of the United Nations which are charged with the exercise of
co-ordinating functions there have been established by General Assembly
and ECOSOC Resolutions two organs which are composed of represen-
tatives of the Secretariat and of individual specialized agencies: the
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) and the Technical
Assistance Board (TAB).
The Administrative Committee on Co-ordination" 4 has two major
109 For the Secretariat as one of the principal organs of the United Nations see
Article 7 and Articles 97-101 of the United Nations Charter. See also infra note 114 on the
membership of the Secretary-General in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
(ACC) and in the Technical Assistance Board (TAB).
110 For the International Court of Justice as one of the principal organs of the
United Nations see Article 7 and Article 92-96 of the United Nations Charter. On the
"Use of the Court by the United Nations" see LIssITZYN, THE INTEaNATIONAL CouRT or
JUSTICE 90-95 (1951).
131 On the possible impact of Security Council action on specialized agencies see infra
p. 691; on the relationship between the principal organs of the United Nations see HossEiN
FAXHER, THE RELATIONSHIP AmONG THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1951).
112 UNiTED NATIONS CHARTER Art. 63, ff 1.
113 See, e.g., Article XI of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 16 U.N. TREATY SER. 325, 336-338 (1948).
11 This Committee was originally styled "Co-ordination Committee," see ECOSOC
Resolution 13(111), adopted on September 21, 1946. Subsequently, the name was changed
to "Secretary-General's Committee on Co-ordination." The name "Administrative Com-
mittee on Co-ordination" was suggested in U.N. Doc. E/1038, August 28, 1948. The new
name of the Committee was formally adopted by the Committee on November 12, 1948;
see U.N. Doc. E/1076, p. 3 (1948).
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objectives: (1) to take all appropriate steps to ensure the fullest and
most effective implementation of the agreements between the United
Nations and the specialized agencies;1165 (2) to forestall, through co-
operation between the executive heads of the specialized agencies, pos-
sible instances of duplication or divergences of policy and suggest solu-
tions for related problems whenever they arise."8 The Economic and
Social Council stands, in principle, ready to review special problems
which the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination might not have
been able to settle.'"
The Technical Assistance Board (TAB) was established by virtue of
Resolution 222(IX) of the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations." 8 In addition, this Resolution provides for a Technical Assis-
tance Committee (TAC). The Technical Assistance Board (TAB) is
composed of the executive heads, or their representatives of the United
Nations and of the specialized agencies. The Secretary-General of the
United Nations, or his representative, shall be the Chairman of the
Board. The specialized agencies which are members of the TAB are
designated as "participating organizations." These organizations are
ex officio members of the TAB and are entitled to receive a specified
percentage of the United Nations Technical Assistance account. Other
specialized agencies take part in the TAB, but not as full-fledged or
"participating organizations"; they are represented by observers without
voting right and do not receive contributions from the United Nations
Technical Assistance account.
The Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) of the Economic and So-
cial Council includes representatives of all the members of ECOSOC.
The provision of paragraph 6 of Resolution 222(IX).. 9 that the TAC
"shall sit while the Council is not in session" was subsequently modi-
fied by the recommendation of the Committee that its sessions should
be held twice a year; and that the Chairman of the Committee should
be authorized to call further sessions of the Committee whenever
necessary.
The Technical Assistance Board (TAB) shall inform the Technical
Assistance Committee of the Council (TAC) of any requests for tech-
115 See ECOSOC Resolution 13(111), adopted on September 21, 1946, ECOSOC OsmzcrA
RECORDS, 3d SEss. No. 3 p. 16 (1946).
116 On policy co-ordination through the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination see
ECOSOC Resolution 259(IX) in U.N. Doc. E/1553, p. 68 (Aug. 15, 1949).
117 Id., at 73.
118 U.N. Doc. E/1533, p. 4-18 (1949).
119 Id. at 6-7.
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nical assistance for economic development as soon as they have reached
the TAB, so that TAC shall always be in possession of a list of projects
being discussed or reviewed by the TAB or TAC. The Secretary-General
of the United Nations is authorized after consultation with the other
participating organizations to designate the Executive Secretary of the
TAB.
The TAC is required to examine the technical assistance activities
which have been undertaken, the results achieved as well as future
programs. The TAC is furthermore charged with reporting on these
activities and making recommendations thereon to ECOSOC. It should
be noted that under paragraph 6(c) of Resolution 222 (IX), the
TAC is authorized "to interpret this resolution in cases of conflicts or
questions submitted to it by the TAB, through its Chairman, and decide
any such conflicts or questions."' 2 °
In accordance with paragraph 7 of Resolution 222(IX) the TAB
and TAC in performing their functions shall be guided by the "Obser-
Vations on and Guiding Principles of an Expanded Program of Tech-
nical Assistance for Economic Development." (Annex I to Resolution
222(IX)).121
In general, it is advisable in discussing principles and problems of
inter-agency co-ordination to distinguish clearly between the following
four major functions of international organizations: (1) Fact Finding
and Research; (2) Operations; (3) Advice to member governments;
(4) Coordination of policies (a) of members; (b) of the policies of the
various intergovernmental organizations concerned. It is comparatively
easy to avoid jurisdictional conflicts in matters relating to factfinding
and research as well as operations; but it requires utmost goodwill and
vigilante to avoid conflicting advice and policy recommendations.
Moreover, it should be noted that the actual obligations of members
cannot always be determined by the words of the organic law of the
international organization alone. Obligations of individual members
may arise at times in the course of the application of the agreement, and
it may be difficult to foresee whether and to what extent the organic
charter of an international organization will be put in action. In addition,
the principal organs of the various organizations have usually broad
discretionary powers. Through the exercise or lack of exercise of these
powers the obligations of individual members may be increased or
decreased. In other words, jurisdictional conflicts may arise not because
120 Id. at 7.
121 Ibid.
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of conflicts inherent in the letter of the basic laws, but as a consequence
of practices which may or may not be authorized under the organic law
of the individual institutions or because of practices which conflict with
inter-agency agreements or commitments.
3. Impact on specialized agencies of Security Council and General
Assembly action for maintaining or restoring peace. It has previously
been indicated122 that conflicts between the United Nations Charter and
inter se agreements may be considered analogous to conflicts between
rules of the constitutional and of the sub-constitutional level. Here the
question will be considered as to whether the constitution of one inter-
national agency may be deemed of a higher level than the constitution
of another. This problem is not a merely academic one. To illustrate
its practical significance it may be sufficient to refer to several provisions
contained in agreements between the United Nations and the individual
specialized agencies and to refer to the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution
of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
(i) Relationship between Security Council and specialized agencies.
Article VI of the Agreement between the United Nations and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) reads:
Assistance to the Security Council
The International Labour Organization agrees to cooperate with the
Economic and Social Council in furnishing suck information and rendering
such assistance to the Security Council as that Council may request includ-
ing assistance in carrying out decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.123 (Italics
added).
By contrast, Article VI of the Agreement between the United Nations
and the Fund provides:
The Fund takes note of the obligation assumed, under paragraph 2 of
Article 48 of the United Nations Charter, by such of its members as are
also Members of the United Nations, to carry okst the decision of the
Security Council through their action in the appropriate specialized agencies
of which they are members, and will, in the conduct of its activities, have
due regard for decisions of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42
of the United Nations Charter.'2 (Italics added).
It is conspicuous: (1) that this provision emphasizes the individual
122 See note 115 supra.
123 1 U.N. TREArY SER. 183, 192-194 (1947).
124 16 U.N. TEATY SER. 325, 332-334 (1948). It should be noted that the special
features of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Fund are also characteristic
of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Bank. Text of the latter agree-
ment in 16 U.N. T"xATY SER. 341-357 (1948).
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obligations of the members of the Fund under Article 48(2) of the
United Nations Charter rather than the obligations of the specialized
agency in corporate capacity which may be read into Article VI of the
Agreement between the United Nations and the International Labour
Organization; (2) that the Fund does not undertake any obligation to
render assistance to the Security Council; (3) that the Fund is only
obligated, in the conduct of its activities to have due regard for decisions
of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations
Charter, whereas under the Agreement with the ILO the Security
Council "may request .. .assistance in carrying out decisions for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security"; (4)
that the Fund is only obligated to assist the Security Council by furnish-
ing to it information "to the fullest extent practicable,"' 5 a qualification
which is not to be found in the agreement between the ILO and the
United Nations. However, the agreements of the United Nations with
the Fund and the ILO both contain a proviso that the obligation to
furnish information is subject to such arrangements as may be necessary
for the safeguarding of confidential material.12
In any case it should be noted that there is an ostensible difference as
to the binding force of the above quoted clauses. One is probably justified
in assuming that the ILO is required to comply with "requests" addressed
to it by the Security Council. By contrast, the Security Council is pre-
cluded from addressing such "requests" to the Bank or Fund. In other
words, provisions such as Article VI of the Agreement between the
United Nations and the ILO constitute a contingent obligation to
"implement" valid decisions of the Security Council. However that may
be, it is difficult to determine in advance what will be the actual scope
of such implementing action on the part of the specialized agencies or
their members. The type of action or inaction which in such instances
will be expected from individual specialized agencies will, of course,
depend to a great extent on the field for which these agencies are respon-
sible under their charters and on the nature of the measures which the
Security Council adopts or recommends.127
125 See Article V, in connection with Article 1(3), of the Agreement between the United
Nations and the Fund. 16 U.N. TR.ATY SER. 332-330 (1948).
126 Article I, 1f 3 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Fund, 16 U.N.
TREATY SER. 330 (1948); Article V, ff 1 of the Agreement between the United Nations
and the International Labour Organization, 1 U.N. TREATY SER. 192 (1947).
127 See on this point Report of thke Collective Measures Committee, U.N. Doc. A/1891,
especially paragraphs 148-161, at 19-20, which deal with the question of existing inter-
national bodies who might assist in the application of "collective measures." It is con-
spicuous that paragraph 151 of the Report assumes that decisions of the Security Council
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In general, it is submitted that clauses such as Article VI of the
UN-ILO Agreement presuppose that in a conflict between the obligations
of the members under the charters of the respective specialized agencies
with obligations arising out of the United Nations Charter, the obli-
gations under the United Nations Charter prevail.
However that may be, any assertion of the "binding force" of the
decisions of the Security Council on members of the United Nations and
of specialized agencies presupposes that the "decisions ... for the main-
tenance of internation~al peace and security" which are referred to in
Article 48(1) of the United Nations Charter are legally in the nature
of "decisions" rather than of "recommendations."
There is every indication that the majority of commentators and
writers 2 ' on the United Nations Charter have heretofore considered the
Security Council's decisions under Articles 41 and 48 on measures to
safeguard peace and security as "decisions" which are binding upon the
members. It may be argued, however, that even the "decisions" under
these Articles are in the nature of recommendations.
Under Article 41, the Security Council may decide what measures, not
involving the use of armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to
apply such measures. It is submitted that the answer to the question
whether or not such decisions are binding as decisions hinges on the
meaning of the term "call upon" in this context. A comparison with
other official versions of the Charter reveals that the French text renders
"call upon" in Article 41 as inviter while the Spanish text employs the
word instar, that is, "urge." It is conspicuous that the French and Span-
ish wording is apt to cast serious doubt on any attempt to give "call
upon" a mandatory meaning which could be considered as an equivalent
of "require," for example.
It would follow that the power of the United Nations under Articles
41 and 48 is limited to decisions to invite members to adopt certain
measures. Hence, such "decisions" may be looked upon as "recom-
(presumably under Article 41 or 44 of the United Nations Charter) are binding on the
members. Paragraph 151 of the Report reads in part as follows:
Both the Bank and the Fund have included in their special agreements with the
United Nations a provision that their operations would be carried on with 'due regard'
to decisions of the Security Council, retaining the right of final decision for themselves,
even though their member nations would be bound by such decisions. (Italics added).
Id. at 19.
128 See, e.g., Goon mcH & MAIO, CARxER OFT E UNITED NATIONS 277 (2d ed. 1949).
"The words 'call upon' are used in this Article in a mandatory sense." See also KEr.sEN,
THE LAW o P vn UNITED NATiONS 745 (1950).
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mendations" to members12 rather than as decisions in the technical
sense. If this reasoning is adopted, it would have to be inferred that
the above mentioned ostensible differences as to the binding force of
Article VI of the Agreement between the United Nations and the ILO
as compared with the corresponding provision of the Agreement between
the United Nations and the Fund would be considerably reduced, if not
nullified.
In general, it is submitted that clauses such as Article VI of the
UN-ILO Agreement presuppose that in a conflict between the obligations
of the members under the charters of the respective specialized agencies
with obligations arising out of the United Nations Charter, the obli-
gations under the United Nations Charter prevail.
(ii) Relationship between General Assembly and specialized agencies.
The Fifth General Assembly of the United Nations resolved on No-
vember 3, 1950 by Resolution 377(V)"30 that whenever the Security
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails
to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression the General Assembly
shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force
if necessary.
The Economic and Social Council requested by Resolution 363 (xii)' 31
that the Secretary-General in consultation with specialized agencies pre-
pare specific arrangements for the furnishing of information and the
rendering of appropriate assistance in the maintenance of international
peace and security as may be requested by the Security Council or the
General Assembly. The reference,to the General Assembly in this con-
text was an innovation as compared with the relevant clauses of the
agreements between the United Nations and individual specialized
agencies. Accordingly, the question arose as to whether or not these
agreements require amendment in order to be harmonized with General
Assembly Resolution 377 (V). Several specialized agencies have solved
this question by regularizing their relationship to the United Nations
through the adoption of appropriate resolutions which expressly recognize
129 On the binding force of recommendations see Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recom-
mendation" of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1948).
130 Text in U.N. Doc. A/1775, pp. 10-12 (1951).
131 ECOSOC Resolution 363 (XII). Text in U.N. Doc. E/1987, pp. 19-20 (1951).
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the recommendatory powers of the General Assembly as to the main-
tenance or restoration of international peace and security.132
4. Relationship between the constitutions of international agencies
which have come into force at different times. Heretofore, conceivable
conflicts between the terms of the various charters of the major inter-
national organizations have been discussed without taking into account
the time element. But here again conflicts arising between earlier and
later charters may present themselves.
In the first place, it is clear that not all charters of the specialized
agencies were drafted at the same time. The Charters of the Bank and
Fund, for instance, were drafted prior to the United Nations Charter
and prior to the liquidation of the League of Nations. Thus they contain
references to "mandates' 1 33 and the "Permanent Court of International
Justice," that is to two institutions which were closely related to the
League of Nations system. However, provision is made in Article
XVIII(c) of the Fund Agreement, for example, that the reference there-
in to the Permanent Court may be replaced "by regulation adopted by
the Fund." Accordingly, By-Law Section 23"'x of the Fund provides that
the President of the International Court of Justice is prescribed as the
authority to appoint an umpire whenever there arises a disagreement of
the type referred to in Article XVIII(c) of the Articles of Agreement.
In the second place, the Charter of an organization which has similar
responsibilities, but which entered into force prior to the Charter of a
more recent organization, may expressly be revoked by the contracting
parties to the earlier Charter. Thus by denunciation of the Charter and
by liquidation of the earlier organization every conceivable conflict be-
tween the old and the new organization may be eliminated. With a view
to avoiding such conflicts between the World Health Organizations
(WHO) and its two major predecessors in the health field, i.e., the Office
International d'Hygiane Publique and the League of Nations Health
Organization, the prospective members of the World Health Organization
agreed that the assets and functions of the older organizations shall be
132 On "Assistance by the Specialized Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace
and Security" see ANN. RP. SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WoRx oF THE ORGANZATION, 1
JULY 1950-30 JUNE 1951, U.N. Doc. A/1844 at 143 (Aug. 1951). For a sample of such a
Resolution see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. SumARY PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
ANNuAL MEETING OF THE BoARD or GOVERNORS, SEPTEimER 1951 at 56-67.
133 Article XX, Section 2(g) of the Fund Agreement, TI.A.S. 1501, p. 28 and Article
XI, Section 2(g) of the Bank Agreement, T.I.A.S. 1502, p. 25.
134 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BY-LAWs AND RULES AND REGULATIONS 18
(Eleventh Issue, November 30, 1951).
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transferred to the WHO'-' and, pending the establishment of WHO, to
the Interim Commission of the WHO.'85
Similarly, the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome adopted
on March 30, 1946, a protocol for the dissolution of the Institute on July
8 of the same year. The functions and activities of the Institute have
thereby been transferred to the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO). 5 7
Also the property rights of the League of Nations in the International
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation were transferred to the United
Nations by resolution of the last assembly of the League. Subsequently,
the Secretary-General invited the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to utilize these assets. The
Institute was'dissolved as of December 31, 1946, and its functions taken
over by UNESCO."8
In the third place, the charter of an existing international organization
may be thoroughly revised in order to harmonize its provisions with that
of a subsequently established organization.
Accordingly, the new Constitution of the International Labour Organ-
ization, adopted in Montreal on October 9, 1946,19 does not constitute
a complete revocation of the original "statute" of the ILO, but rather
a farreaching and formal amendment of the latter with a view to elimi-
nating all references to the League of Nations system and to replacing
them by appropriate references to the United Nations. On the basis of
its new Constitution the ILO was transformed into a specialized agency
while, in principle, it is financially independent of the United Nations.
In contrast to the Office International d'Hygiane Publique, the Inter-
national Institute of Agriculture, and the International Institute of Intel-
lectual Cooperation, the ILO has, of course, not been liquidated as an
135 See Arrangement concluded by the Governments Represented at the International
Health Conference, held in the City of New York, from 19 June to 22 July 1946 in YEA-
BOOK OF THE UNITeD NATIONS, 801-802 (1946-1947).
'136 See Article 2 of the Protocol concerning the Office International d'Hygigne Publique;
it reads:
The parties to this protocol further agree that, as between themselves, from the date
when this protocol comes into force, the duties and functions conferred upon the
Office by the international agreements listed in Annex I shall be performed by the
Organization or its Interim Commission.
Id. at 803-804. This Protocol was done in New York on July 2, 1946.
137 Text in T.I.A.S. 1719.
1-8 See "Utilization by UNESCO of Property Rights of League of Nations in the Inter-
national Institute of Intellectual Cooperation." U.N. Doe. A/64, Add. 1, p. 133 1947).
139 For text of the 1946 constitution of the ILO indicating in italics the changes from
the 1919 Statute, as amended in 1934 and 1945, in 15 U.N. TREATY SEa. 36-122 (1948).
[Vol. 3 7
SUPERSESSION OF TREATIES
international organization and its charter was thoroughly amended, but
not terminated.
Finally, a conflict between a later and earlier charter may be resolved
by termination of the earlier charter through "desuetude." 140 The demise
of the League of Nations furnishes perhaps the most striking illustration
for this statement. It has often been overlooked that the Covenant of
the League of Nations has never been expressly revoked. Actually, the
Assembly Resolution of April 18, 1946, was but designed to terminate
the activities of the League and to transfer its assets and functions to
the United Nations and the appropriate specialized agencies. It did not
expressly revoke the Covenant, but provided that "with effect from
the day following the close of the present Session of the Assembly, the
League of Nations shall cease to exist except for the sole purpose of the
liquidation of its affairs as provided in the present resolution."' 1
In general, the principles relating to conflicts between treaties of the
same level and inter se arrangements as well as the principles relating
to conflicts between treaties of different level which have been discussed
heretofore apply also to conflicts between treaties of different level and
inter se arrangements. It is submitted that these principles apply, in
particular, to the law of those international institutions whose charters
are embodied in multipartite treaties.
V. SPECIAL RULE MAY SUPERSEDE GENERAL RULE
Whenever a legal document (constitution, statute, international agree-
ment) contains a general clause and one or more special clauses the ques-
tion of the "relative weight" of these clauses may be raised for purposes
of interpretation.
According to general principles of interpretation three alternative
solutions of conflicts between general and special clauses are conceivable:
(1) The special clause may be considered as cancelling out the general
clause in accordance with the maxim lex specialis derogat generali;
(2) The special clause may be considered as supplementary to the gen-
eral clause; (3) The general clause may be considered as an over-
.riding provision prevailing over conflicting provisions of a special clause.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to state in general terms which of
140 For "desuetude" as a means of terminating treaties see Kunz, The Meaning and the
Range of the Normn Pacta sunt Servanda, 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 193 (1945), especially n. 66, 67.
141 Text of the Resolution in LEAGUE Or NATIONS, OmwicL JoURNAL, Special Supplement
No. 194, p. 269-272; see also Myers, Liquidation of League of Nations Functions, 42 Ams.
J. INT'L L. 330 (1948).
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these three conceivable approaches will be selected in interpreting one
or more provisions of a particular legal document.
It is obvious, however, that general provisions are not superseded by
special provisions if the special clause is considered supplementary to
the general clause or if the general clause has the character of an over-
riding or controlling provision. Only if the special clause is cancelling
out the general clause does it "supersede" or "abrogate" the general
clause. This situation is reflected in the maxim lex specialis derogat
generali. This maxim is primarily a principle of legal logic; it applies,
irrespective of the time element, that is to say, in reference to treaty
law it applies to the interpretation of the relationship between a special
and a general clause in the same treaty as well as to conflicts between
such clauses in two or several treaties. The maxim lex specialis derogat
generali may, however, be combined with the maxim that the later law
prevails over the earlier law. A combination of these two maxims, if
applied to the relationship between later and earlier treaties, leads to
the conclusion that a later treaty prevails over an earlier treaty, if (1)
the scope of the later treaty is of the same degree of generality as the
earlier treaty, or (2) if the later treaty is a lex Jpecialis in relation to
the earlier treaty of the type which cancels out the general clause. If,
however, the provisions of the later treaty are in effect special clauses
which either supplement the earlier treaty provisions or have to give
way to a controlling or overriding clause the later treaty does not prevail
over the earlier treaty. Moreover, if the scope of the later treaty pro-
visions is broader than that of the earlier ones the maxim lex posterior
generalis non derogat priori specialis"42 applies.
For the purposes of this paper the possible combination of the maxim
lex posterior derogat priori with the maxim lex specialis derogat generali
is of greatest interest. The Mavrommatis case furnishes a noteworthy
142 See on this point also MAXwELL, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 183 (9th ed.
1946) who illustrates the maxim Generalia spedalibus non derogant by the following
quotation:
where general words in a later Act are capable of reasonable and sensible application
without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation ... that
earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, altered or derogated
from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular
intention to do so.
Steward v. The Vera Cruz, 10 A.C. 59, 68 (1884) (Lord Shelbourne, C.), and other cases
quoted therein. See also 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2021
(3d ed. 1943). ". . .where the later general statute does not propose an irreconcilable
conflict, the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in effect as a qualification
of or exception to the general law." See furthermore, 1 ANZILOTTI, CoURs DF DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL 104 (1929).
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example of a simultaneous application of both principles. Here the
Permanent Court of International Justice held:
It is certain that Protocol XII [of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne] is an
international instrument, quite distinct from and independent of the Man-
date for Palestine. It deals specifically and in explicit terms with concessions
such as those of M. Mavrommatis, whereas Article 11 of the Mandate deals
with them only implicitly. Furthermore it is more recent in date than the
Mandate. All the conditions therefore are fulfilled which might nake the
clauses of the Protocol overrule those of the Mandate....
The fact that Article 11 [of the Mandate for Palestine] only refers to the
Protocol in general terms, and that the Protocol is more recent in date
than the Mandate, does not justify the conclusion that the Protocol would
only be applicable in Palestine in so far as it is compatible with the Man-
date. On the contrary, in cases of doubt, the Protocol, being a special and
more recent agreement, should prevail.' 43 (Italics added).
By contrast, the Upper Silesia Minorities case confirms the principles
that a general clause whose overriding character is beyond dispute cannot
validly be modified by a subsequent lex specialis. In this case the
Permanent Court of International Justice held:
Before considering the case, on its merits, the Court deems it necessary to
establish what is the relationship existing between the provisions of Divi-
sion I of the third Part of the Geneva Convention and those which are to be
found in Division II of the same Part.
The Court in this respect recalls the fact that the provisions of Division I
are provisions the terms of which were settled beforehand by the Conference
of Ambassadors. They had to be accepted such as they were and subject
to no modifications. . . . These provisions constitute a separate category
among the provisions relating to the protection of minorities, and sub-
sequent provisions entered into between the contracting Parties cannot
modify them or be construed as being contradictory and thus diminishing
thMe extent of the protection provided....
In view of the particular and predominant character of the provisions of
Division I of the Convention, it follows that any construction of the pro-
visions of Division II which would conflict with the meaning of the pro-
visions of Division I must be excluded. The stipulations of Division II
must be construed in the light of the stipulations of Division I and not the
reverse.'4 (Italics added).
It follows from the foregoing consideration that any realistic analysis
of the maxim lex posterior derogat priori has to take into account the
relative scope or degree of generality of the earlier and the later rule.
34 P.C.IJ., Ser. A No. 2 at 30, 31 (1924).
144 P.C.I.J., Ser. A No. 15 at 30, 31 (1928).
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VI. CONCLUSION
First, the principle lex posterior derogat priori is applicable to treaty
law if the following five requirements are met: (1) if the later treaty
covers the same subject as the earlier treaty; (2) if the later treaty
involves the same parties as the earlier treaty; (3) if the later treaty
is of the same level as or of a ,higher level than the earlier treaty; (4) if
the scope of the later treaty is of the same degree of generality as the
earlier treaty; (5) if the legal effect or effects provided for in the later
treaty is or are different from that of the earlier treaty.
Second, if these five requirements are met the earlier treaty is voidable
to the extent that it is incompatible with the later treaty.
Third, if one or more of the above five requirements are met only in
part, the extent to which the earlier treaty is superseded by the later
treaty is to be determined by way of interpretation. It may be contro-
versial, in particular: (1) whether and to what extent a later treaty
concluded by two or more parties to a multilateral treaty without consent
of all the original parties is valid; (2) whether and to what extent a
treaty of the higher level prevails over a treaty of the lower level, e.g., the
United Nations Charter over arrangements inter se of the members of
the United Nations; (3) whether and to what extent a later treaty whose
scope is less general than the original treaty (lex specialis) conflicts with
an earlier treaty which is broader in scope; (4) whether, in case a treaty
is declared voidable by the appropriate organ or organs of the community
of nations or by appropriate domestic agencies on the ground that it is at
variance with a, later treaty, such a treaty becomes invalid ex nunc, i.e.,
from the time it has been declared invalid; or whether it becomes
invalid ex tunc, i.e., from the date it entered into force.
It should be clear that these admittedly controversial questions cannot
"automatically" be solved by reference to more or less general principles.
Whenever conflicting provisions give rise to reasonable doubt which of
two or more rules should be applied in the light of the above principles,
the ultimate decision will have to be arrived at with due regard to all
relevant circumstances and in accordance with traditional standards of
interpretation.
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